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ABSTRACT 
 
Employee share incentive schemes have become a common phenomenon in companies 
world-wide and are an established method of allowing the employee to hold equity in the 
company which in turn allows the employee to personally benefit from the growth and 
profitability of the company. In light of the fact that employees receive remuneration by 
virtue of their employment and through their participation in these employee share 
schemes, the tax treatment of this remuneration should be considered in terms of the 
South African taxation laws. 
The Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 has been amended over time so as to introduce various 
anti-avoidance rules aimed at preventing employee participants in these schemes from 
classifying income received by virtue of employment as either dividends or capital gains. 
These anti-avoidance provisions, contained in sections 8C and 10(1)(k)(i) and the Eighth 
Schedule to the ITA, have evolved since their introduction, so as to: 
1. address any anomalies and to close perceived loopholes identified in terms of 
these provisions; and 
2. to clarify the circumstances in which these provisions will find application.  
This study highlights the evolution of these anti-avoidance provisions and discusses (a) 
whether the amendments succeeded in addressing the anomalies and closing loopholes 
as intended; and (b) whether the amendments inadvertently created any additional 
anomalies. 
An analysis of the current wording of the anti-avoidance provisions is conducted and the 
impact these provisions on the most prevalent employee share schemes operating 
through trusts is explored, whereafter suggestions for further amendments to the ITA are 
proposed. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
  
“Taxes are the lifeblood of government and no taxpayer should be permitted 
to escape the payment of his just share of the burden of contributing thereto.” 
– Arthur Vanderbilt 
 
1.1 Background 
Employee share incentive schemes have become a common phenomenon in companies 
world-wide. These schemes are popular mechanisms through which employees are 
awarded remuneration that is equity-based.1 South Africa is no exception, as is evidenced 
from the sheer number of listed South African companies’ annual reports disclosing some 
form of employee share incentive scheme.2  
Various employee share incentive schemes can be found in the South African market. 
Employee share incentive schemes are typically aimed at one of two categories of 
employees, namely (a) senior management and / or executive directors of a company, 
and (b) schemes in terms of which all employees are eligible to participate. The operation 
of each scheme depends on a variety of factors, such whether the company is listed or 
unlisted, whether the scheme is an equity-settled or cash-settled scheme, and whether 
the scheme is administrated by way of a trust.  
The rationale behind the design and implementation of the schemes differ, but generally 
the purpose of these schemes are:3 
                                                
1 Global Equity Insights 2015, accessed on 3 March 2018, https://www.equatex.com/wp-
content/uploads/GEO_Report_2015_Equatex_web.pdf?x93601.  
2 Employee share incentive schemes are not limited to companies operating in a listed environment, but 
extend to private companies as well. Given the lack of public disclosure of private company data, the 
observations herein are predominantly drawn from studying the integrated annual reports of listed 
companies. 
3 Samantha Jonas, “A Critical Analysis of the Tax Efficiency of Share Incentive Schemes in Relation to 
Employees In South Africa,” (MCom Taxation thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 2012), 12 – 14. 
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1. To align the interests of employees with those of the stakeholders of the company 
by providing the employee with a form of equity-based remuneration.4 This 
ensures that the employee’s remuneration is linked to the company’s share price, 
which in turn encourages share price growth; 
2. To attract, retain and motivate employees to deliver their company’s business 
strategy;5 and 
3. To encourage ownership in the company through participation in a broad-based 
equity plan.6 
In light of the fact that employees may effectively receive remuneration by virtue of both 
their employment and through their participation in these employee share schemes, the 
tax treatment of these schemes must be carefully considered in order to prevent the re-
characterisation of remuneration as capital gains or exempt dividends. 
The Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (hereafter referred to as “the ITA”) currently deals with 
the taxation of equity instruments acquired by virtue of an employee’s employment in 
section 8C. Section 8C applies notwithstanding sections 9C7 and 23(m)8 of the ITA and 
places the obligation on taxpayers to include in their gross income9 for the year of 
assessment10 any gain or loss with regards to the vesting of an equity instrument11 
acquired by the taxpayer12 by virtue of his employment or office as director.  
Historically, employee share incentive schemes were often designed and operated in 
such a manner as to allow the income received in terms of these schemes to be classified 
                                                
4 Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, “Why do some firms give stock options to all employees?: An empirical 
examination of alternative theories,” Journal of Financial Economics, 76 (2005):100 and Jonas, 13. 
5 Takalani Philip Nyelisani, “Employee perceptions of share schemes,” (MBA thesis, University of 
Pretoria, 2010), 20 and Jonas, 13-14. 
6 Jonas, 13-14. 
7 Section 9C deems an equity share which was held for a period of more than three years before its 
disposal to be of a capital nature. As section 8C overrides this provision, this means that section 8C will 
apply in the event where an equity share vests after a period of three years and that gain arising upon the 
disposal of the equity share will be taxable as income. 
8 This provision prohibits the deduction of expenditure, loss or allowance which relates to employment or 
office held in respect of which remuneration is earned. As section 8C overrides this provision, it means 
that losses remain deductible in respect of the section 8C equity instruments. 
9 Defined in section 1 of the ITA. 
10 Defined in section 1 of the ITA. 
11 Defined in section 8C(7) of the ITA. 
12 Defined in section 1 of the ITA. 
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as either exempt dividend income or as a capital gain.13 This resulted in the participants 
to the schemes being taxed at a lower rate than if such income was received as 
remuneration. In light of this trend, the ITA underwent various amendments14 over the 
past decade so as to introduce anti-avoidance rules aimed at preventing employees from 
classifying income received by virtue of employment as either dividends or capital gains.  
The above-mentioned anti-avoidance provisions, contained in section 8C, section 
10(1)(k)(i) and the Eighth Schedule to the ITA, have been evolving since their introduction 
so as to: 
1. address any anomalies and to close perceived loopholes identified in terms of 
these provisions; and 
2. to clarify the circumstances when these provisions will find application. 
1.2 Rationale for the research 
Over the past decade, anti-avoidance measures were introduced into the ITA to 
specifically regulate the tax consequences of employee share incentive schemes, 
particularly those operating through South African resident share incentive trusts 
(hereafter referred to as “SITs”). Employee share incentive schemes had developed 
following the introduction of section 8C so as to avoid the application of section 8C on 
technical grounds. Specifically, a number of schemes had evolved so as to utilise SITs 
as vehicles in which shares were held and in which a participant did not obtain a right to 
the actual underlying shares, but rather a right to the value of the shares held in the SIT.  
The anti-avoidance provisions impacting on employee share incentive schemes operating 
through SITs as contained in section 8C, section 10(1)(k)(i) and the Eighth Schedule to 
the ITA have been a particular focus of National Treasury over the past decade as is 
evidenced by various Revenue and Taxation Laws Amendment Acts15 and the 
                                                
13 J Kotze “Tax update 2017” http://www.wylie.co.za/wp-content/uploads/Tax-Update-2017-Third-Q-.pdf 
(accessed 1 March 2018). 
14 See Revenue Laws Amendment Act 32 of 2004; Revenue Laws Amendment Act 20 of 2006, Revenue 
Laws Amendment Act 60 of 2008; Taxation Laws Amendment Act 7 of 2010; Taxation Laws Amendment 
Act 24 of 2011; Taxation Laws Amendment Act 22 of 2012; Taxation Laws Amendment Act 31 of 2013; 
Taxation Laws Amendment Act 25 of 2015; Taxation Laws Amendment Act 15 of 2016; Taxation Laws 
Amendment Act 17 of 2017. 
15 Ibid. 
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accompanying Explanatory Memoranda. In particular, the Explanatory Memorandum on 
the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2017 explains that, over the past few years, 
amendments were made to the ITA to refine these anti-avoidance provisions and to 
address several unintended anomalies, including the anomaly that the disposal of an 
equity instrument by a trust to a qualifying participant constitutes a non-event for capital 
gains tax (“CGT”) purposes in terms of the Eighth Schedule.16 Several provisions of the 
ITA were clarified so as to defer the recognition of the capital gain in the trust when it 
disposes of shares to a participant in terms of the scheme, until the equity instruments 
become unrestricted and vests for purposes of section 8C.17  
The amendments included changes to the Eighth Schedule which stated that, where the 
trust disposes of shares and vests the proceeds in the hands of the qualifying 
participant,18 then the provisions of paragraph 80(2) will not apply if such amount is to be 
taken into account in the hands of the qualifying participant for purposes of section 8C of 
the ITA.19 
In light of the amendments to these anti-avoidance provisions (particularly those 
addressing employee share incentive schemes operating through SITs), and the effects 
of these amendments on participants of employee share incentive schemes, a detailed 
analysis of those amendments is beneficial in order to understand: 
1. the effects of these amendments on participants to these schemes, in particular:  
a) the treatment of dividends received by participants from SITs on restricted equity 
instruments; and  
                                                
16 Refer to National Treasury “Explanatory Memorandum to the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill 2015,” 10, 
accessed on 4 April 2018, http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/ExplMemo/LAPD-LPrep-EM-2015-
01%20-20Explanatory%20Memorandum%20on%20the%20TLA%20Bill%2029%20of%202015.pdf and 
the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 25 of 2015 at section 123; and the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 17 
of 2017 which amendment paragraphs 80(1), 80(2), 80(2A) and 64E of the Eighth Schedule. See also 
section 13(1) of Taxation Laws Amendment Act 15 of 2016 which amended section 8C(1A). 
17 Defined in section 1 of the ITA. 
18 For purposes of clarity, “participant” refers to employees who participate in employee share incentive 
schemes operating through trusts by virtue of their employment. Where appropriate, these employees 
may also be referred to as “employee beneficiaries” or “employees”. 
19 National Treasury “Explanatory Memorandum to the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill 2017,”10, 
accessed on 5 April 2018, http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/ExplMemo/LAPD-LPrep-EM-2017-
01%20-%20Explanatory%20Memorandum%20on%20the%202017%20Taxation%20Laws% 
20Amendment%20Bill%2015%20December%202017.pdf.  
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b) the CGT treatment on the disposal of shares held by SITs, as well as the CGT 
treatment of the vesting and distribution of shares or gains derived from the 
disposal of shares, to participants of the SIT. 
2. whether these amendments addressed the inconsistencies and anomalies created by 
previous amendments to the ITA; and  
3. whether further inconsistencies and anomalies provisions may inadvertently have 
been caused by these amendments to the ITA. 
The author accordingly formulated three key research objectives which are set out below. 
1.3 Research objectives and value of research 
This dissertation is aimed at achieving the following research objectives: 
1. Considering the most prevalent employee share incentive schemes in South 
Africa, with a focus on schemes which utilise SITs, in order to provide the 
necessary context for the discussions in chapters 3 and 4 with regards to the anti-
avoidance provisions in section 8C, section 10(1)(k)(i) and the Eighth Schedule 
which impact on employee share incentive schemes operating through SITs. 
2. Exploring the development of these anti-avoidance provisions impacting on 
employee share incentive schemes operating through SITs over the last decade, 
with a focus on identifying anomalies created by and/or addressed by amendments 
to these provisions. 
3. Conducting an analysis of the perceived anomalies that still persist in relation to 
the CGT implications of employee share incentive schemes operating through 
SITs, including recommendations of possible amendments which could be made 
to the anti-avoidance provisions in the Eighth Schedule to address these 
anomalies. 
The author has identified two anomalies arising from the current wording of the anti-
avoidance provisions in the Eighth Schedule and which impact on employee share 
incentive schemes operating through SITs. Apart from a comment contained in the Final 
Response Document on Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2017 and Tax Administration 
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Bill, 201720 suggesting an amendment to the wording of paragraph 80(1) and paragraph 
64E of the Eighth Schedule, no other academic writings, books or government 
publications have been identified which highlight these anomalies or offer suggestions for 
addressing these anomalies. This dissertation aims to fill this gap by highlighting the 
perceived anomalies negatively impacting on employee share incentive schemes 
operating through SITs which result from the current wording of the anti-avoidance 
provisions in the Eighth Schedule; and by recommending possible amendments which 
National Treasury could consider and which may address the anomalies that persist. 
1.4 Research methodology 
The research methodology employed in this dissertation is doctrinal research. The 
research consists of a systematic exploration of the anti-avoidance provisions impacting 
upon employee share incentive schemes operating through trusts, as well as the common 
employee share incentive schemes operating through trusts. A critical and systematic 
analysis of these anti-avoidance provisions is conducted through which the purpose of 
and interaction between these provisions is highlighted. The research evaluates the 
adequacy of the anti-avoidance provisions and exposes two anomalies which currently 
impact upon employee share incentive schemes operating through trusts. Finally, 
recommendations are offered in respect to addressing these anomalies.  
1.5 Structure of the dissertation  
This dissertation consists of five chapters. A brief description of the contents of each of 
the following chapters is set out below: 
Chapter 2: Common structures of employee share incentive schemes run through trusts 
This chapter considers the most prevalent employee share incentive schemes in South 
Africa, with a focus on schemes which utilise share incentive trusts (“SITs”), in order to 
provide the necessary context for the discussions in chapters 3 and 4 with regards to the 
                                                
20 National Treasury, Final Response Document on Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2017 and Tax 
Administration Laws Amendment Bill, 2017, paragraph 2.3 on 12, accessed 8 April 2018, 
http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/RespDocs/LAPD-LPrep-Resp-2017-06%20-%20 
Final%20Response%20Document%202017%20TLAB%20and%20TALAB%2015%20December%202017
.pdf 
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anti-avoidance provisions in section 8C, section 10(1)(k)(i) and the Eighth Schedule which 
impact on employee share incentive schemes operating through SITs. It sets out the most 
prevalent employee share schemes found in the South African market which typically 
utilises a SIT. A brief history and the rationale behind the structure and implementation of 
these schemes is discussed and the salient features and workings of each scheme is set 
out.  
Chapter 3: Anti-avoidance provisions impacting on employee share incentive schemes 
run through trusts 
Chapter 3 aims to explore the development of the anti-avoidance provisions in section 
8C, section 10(1)(k)(i) and the Eighth Schedule impacting on employee share incentive 
schemes operating through SITs over the last decade, with a focus on identifying 
anomalies created by and/or addressed by the amendments to these provisions. It sets 
out the history and original purpose behind the implementation of these key anti-
avoidance provisions which impact on the tax consequences of employee share incentive 
schemes operating through SITs. The significant amendments to these provisions over 
the past decade is further explored. This chapter also sets out the implication of the 
wording of the current anti-avoidance provisions in section 8C and section 10(1)(k)(i) as 
they stand on the employee share incentive schemes as set out in Chapter 2. Comments 
on the effectiveness of these anti-avoidance provisions in achieving the purpose for which 
they were implemented are included. This chapter further identifies anomalies created by 
the amendments to the anti-avoidance provisions in order to provide the context required 
to understand the discussion in Chapter 4 in respect of the perceived anomalies which 
still persist in relation to the CGT implications of employee share incentive schemes 
operating through SITs. 
Chapter 4: Current anti-avoidance provisions of the Eighth Schedule: Do anomalies 
remain and how could these anomalies be addressed? 
This chapter is aimed at conducting an analysis of the perceived anomalies that still 
persist in relation to the CGT implications of employee share incentive schemes operating 
through SITs, including recommendations of possible amendments which could be made 
to the anti-avoidance provisions in the Eighth Schedule to address these anomalies. 
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It sets out an analysis of the current wording of paragraphs 80(1), 80(2) and 64E of the 
Eighth Schedule and includes comments on the effectiveness of these provisions in 
achieving the aim for which they were implemented. The implications of these provisions 
for common employee share incentive scheme operating through SITs are examined by 
way of a case study in order to illustrate how participants under such schemes will be 
taxed. Recommendations on addressing these anomalies are offered.  
Chapter 5: Conclusion  
This chapter draws together the findings of the study as well as its relevance and sets out 
how the research objectives were achieved. Recommendations are set out / emphasised 
in this chapter and areas for further analysis are also identified. 
1.6 Limitations of Scope 
The scope of this study is limited to employee share incentive schemes which are 
operated through using a South African resident SITs as the amendments to section 8C, 
section 10(1)(k)(i) and the Eight Schedule over the past decade are predominantly anti-
avoidance provisions impacting on employee share incentive schemes operating through 
trusts. Chapter 2 sets out the common structures and workings of employee share 
incentive schemes operated through SITs which are found in South Africa and which are 
impacted by the changes to the anti-avoidance provisions as set out in the ITA. Given 
that employee share incentive schemes are tailored from their inception to fit the 
requirements and profile of the company and employees for whom the scheme is 
intended, variations of these schemes can be found in the South African market. As such, 
the list of schemes discussed is by no means meant to be exhaustive, but is rather aimed 
at highlighting the salient features of the most commonly used schemes and illustrating 
the effects of the amendments to the ITA on these schemes. 
This study does not differentiate between executive share plans and all-employee share 
plans using trusts, as both types of schemes are treated in a similar manner for income 
tax purposes. Broad-based schemes which meet the requirements of section 8B of the 
ITA are excluded from this study, given that these schemes are rarely found in practice.  
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In addition to the above, it should be noted that, unless otherwise indicated, no distinction 
is drawn between employee share incentive schemes operated in a listed company 
environment and schemes operated in private companies. Although there are differences 
between schemes operated in a listed environment and those operating in a private 
environment, these schemes do not differ for the purposes of the anti-avoidance 
provisions as contained in the ITA. The same rationale applies to the tax treatment of 
schemes run for the benefit of executives and schemes run for the benefit of all 
employees. 
The aim of this dissertation is not to explore the tax treatment of the various employee 
share schemes or how participants to these schemes are taxed in detail, as significant 
research has already been undertaken in this area.21 As such, the exploration of the 
evolution of the provisions contained in s8C is limited to the original purpose of this section 
and the specific anti-avoidance provisions which impact employee share schemes 
operated through trusts. 
The retrospective application, if any, of amendments to the ITA is not discussed in this 
dissertation but is rather highlighted as an area of future study. 
Finally, the scope of this study is limited to the anti-avoidance provisions (and their 
respective amendments) which prevent the characterisation of income as either a capital 
gain22 or a dividend23 and which impact upon employee share incentive schemes 
operating through trusts. As the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill 2018 introduced in July 
2018 is still in draft, the focus of the study is limited to the anti-avoidance provisions as 
they currently read in the ITA and the proposed amendments are only touched on briefly 
in Chapter 4.  
                                                
21 See Elriette Esme Butler “Employee Share Incentive Schemes- The taxation of the old and the ‘new’” 
(H.Dip (Taxation) Technical Report, University of Cape Town 2005); and Louise Mercia Bezuidenhout 
“Employee share incentive schemes: an integrated approach.” (MComm thesis, University of Cape Town 
2006). 
22 The provisions focused on preventing income as being disguised as a capital gain are contained within 
section 8C and paragraphs 64E, 80(1) and 80(2) of the Eighth Schedule and must be read together. 
Refer to the discussions in Chapters 3 and 4 below. 
23 The provisions which prevent income as being disguised as dividends are set out in section 
10(1)(k)(i)(dd), (ii), (jj) and (kk). These provisions must also be read with the provisions in section 8C.  
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In light of the above background, and in order to fully understand the impact of the 
amendments to the anti-avoidance provisions as contained in the ITA and which are the 
focus of this study, one must commence by setting out and understanding the history and 
intention behind these provisions. This is dealt with in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 2: Common employee share incentive schemes 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Employee share incentive schemes are common in South African companies.24 Share 
incentive schemes aimed at the remuneration of executives and employees were 
originally introduced as a mechanism through which companies attempted to counter the 
high levels of individual taxes.25 It has, however, become evident that share incentive 
schemes have an added bonus of acting as a retention mechanism as well as a way in 
which to drive company performance.26 
Over the years, different types of schemes have developed so as to address the various 
needs of companies and to mitigate the changes in income tax legislation27 impacting 
upon the operation of these schemes.28 A number of studies have been conducted over 
the past decade with regards to the taxation of the different types of share incentive 
schemes prevalent in the South African market.  
This chapter considers the most prevalent employee share incentive schemes in South 
Africa, with a focus on schemes which utilise share incentive trusts (“SITs”), in order to 
provide the necessary context for the discussions in chapters 3 and 4 with regards to the 
anti-avoidance provisions in section 8C, section 10(1)(k)(i) and the Eighth Schedule which 
impact on employee share incentive schemes operating through SITs. 
This is done by exploring the rationale behind companies adopting share incentive 
schemes; the key variable features of employee share incentive schemes; as well as 
setting out the salient features of the most prevalent employee share incentive schemes 
                                                
24 Allon Joel Isaacman, “Is tax legislation effectively discouraging employee share ownership?” MCom 
thesis, University of Witwatersrand, 2017, 11. 
25 M Stafford, “The transition in the nature of tax consequences associated with share incentive schemes 
in South Africa,” LLM thesis, University of Witwatersrand, 2005.  
26 Global Equity Insights 2017, 3 and 9; Isaacman, 21; Jonas, 32. 
27 Refer to the discussion in chapter 3 on the various changes to the ITA impacting upon such schemes. 
28 Isaacman, 11; Jonas, 16. 
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which typically make use of a SIT: share purchase schemes, share option schemes, 
deferred delivery schemes and phantom share schemes.29 
2.2 Motivation for the implementation of employee share incentive schemes 
There are numerous reasons for companies to consider and implement an employee 
share incentive scheme. Each company will have its own set of unique circumstances 
which drives the motivation of the adoption of a particular employee share incentive plan.  
The section below sets out the most prevalent reasons for the adoption of share 
schemes.30 
2.2.1 Alignment with shareholder interests & motivation 
Research indicates that the interests of the employees of a company, specifically the 
company management is not always aligned to that of the company’s stakeholders. Adam 
Smith, in his well-known work “The Wealth of Nations”31 makes the following astute 
observation: 
“The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the managers 
rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that 
they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners 
in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich 
man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s 
honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence 
and profusion, therefore must always prevail, more or less, in the management of 
the affairs of such a company.”32 
Jensen and Meckling deem the relationship between the shareholders of a company and 
the managers of the company to be that of an agency relationship.33 As such, the 
misalignment of the interests of shareholders and employees is known as agency theory. 
                                                
29 Isaacman, 11; Butler, 12-18; Bezuidenhout, 11-22; Nicholas Lock, “Dividend payments from employee 
share incentive trusts,” MCom thesis, University of Cape Town, 2017, 13-15. 
30 Global Equity Insights, 2017, 3 and 9; Jonas, 12; Bezuidenhout, 3. 
31 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of Wealth of Nations, (London, 1852). 
32 Ibid, 311. 
33 Michael C Jensen and William H Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, 3 (1976): 309. 
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Although directors of a company have a legal duty in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008 to act in the best interests of the company, this is not always guaranteed.34  
In light thereof, it is necessary to identify methods through which employees’ interests will 
align to the interests of shareholders. Research has shown remuneration to be key in this 
attempt at alignment. For example, Oyer and Schaefer note that: “linking an employee’s 
wealth to the value of the firm might overcome agency problems and motivate the 
employee to take actions that are in the firm’s interest.”35 
One approach to achieve this alignment, is the use of short-term incentive schemes in 
terms of which employees receive a cash bonus if certain performance criteria are met. 
Although successful to some degree, there is a risk of employees becoming too focused 
on short-term profitability of the company and taking unnecessary risks as opposed to 
taking a long-term view.36 
As such, share incentive schemes have become a popular mechanism through which to 
align the employees of a company with the long-term interests of both the company and 
its shareholders. Equity-based compensation in particular, whether settled in equity or in 
cash, is a useful tool through which the employee is motivated to drive the long-term 
growth and success of the company, as an increase in share price would result in the 
employee receiving a larger gain upon settlement. An advantage of this approach is that 
the employee is simultaneously provided with remuneration and ownership in the 
company, enabling that employee to share in the growth of that company. 
2.2.2 Attraction, retention and reward of employees 
Employee share incentive schemes have become a common tool in aiding the company’s 
ability to both attract and retain employees.37 The attraction and retention of employees 
                                                
34 Rutger Muurling and Thorsten Lehnert, “Option-based compensation: a survey.” The International 
Journal of Accounting. 39 (2004): 365 – 401. See also the King IV Report on Corporate Governance, 26, 
https://www.adamsadams.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/King-IV-Report.pdf . 
35 Oyer and Schafer, 100. 
36 Muurling & Lehnert, 375. 
37 Nyelisani, 20; Jonas, 14. 
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are of significant importance in the current climate where the levels of employee mobility 
are high.38  
Remuneration of which the payment is deferred until a future date, makes it costly for 
employees to leave the employ of their companies.39 Employee share incentive schemes 
are typically subject to a vesting period and contain provisos which govern situations 
where the participant leaves the employ of the company prior to the vesting of the plan. 
Most often, unless otherwise indicated, employees will forfeit their rights to the value of 
their awards received under the scheme.40  
2.3 Key variable features of employee share incentive schemes 
Although employee share incentive schemes have evolved over time due to changes in 
legislation which has impacted the taxation of such schemes, certain key variable features 
remain of importance across all employee share incentive schemes) and are discussed 
below.41 
2.3.1 Eligible employees 
The eligibility of employees to participate in these schemes, also remain the prerogative 
of the employer company.42 Initially, participation in employee share incentive schemes 
were largely limited to a company’s executive directors and other executives.43 As the 
requirements of companies changed over the years, so employee share incentive 
schemes evolved and participation was extended to lower levels of employees. The 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 introduced Broad Based 
Black Economic Empowerment (“BBBEE”) in South Africa. As a result, various companies 
                                                
38 Derek C Jones, Panu Kalmi & Mikko Mäkinen, “The productivity effect of stock option schemes: 
evidence from Finnish panel data,” Journal of Productivity Analysis 33 (2010): 68. 
39 Oyer & Schaefer, 100. 
40 Employee share incentive scheme rules typically contain provisions setting out how an employee’s 
awards will be treated upon termination of employment. Although most sets of scheme rules do provide 
for the eventuality where an employee is labelled as a “good leaver” and the termination of employment 
was not due to fault, it is the fault termination provisions (or “bad leaver”) provisions which aid the 
retention of employees. 
41 Jonas, 33. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Jones et al, 70. 
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implemented share incentive schemes in such a manner as to increase and improve their 
BBBEE compliance ratings.44 
2.3.2 SITs 
Employee share incentive schemes often make use of a SIT45 as a mechanism for the 
implementation of the scheme.46 A SIT is an inter vivos trust and was originally used in 
the administration of share incentive schemes as a way to circumvent certain provisions 
of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (which has since been repealed), which regulated the 
prohibition of financial assistance to executives, in a legal manner.47 This prohibition has 
since been lifted in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.48  
The SIT is managed and administrated by its trustees. The SIT trust deed governs the 
following:49 
1. Share option schemes: the awarding of share options to the selected participants; 
2. Share purchase schemes: initiating the offers to purchase shares; 
3. Allocating voting rights and dividend rights to the participants which are linked to 
their respective shares or units; 
4. Administrating the loans granted to employees for purposes of purchasing shares 
in the SIT; and 
5. Administrating the processes upon the termination of the employment of the 
participant. 
The purpose of a SIT is primarily as a conduit between the participants and the employer 
companies and to hold company shares for the benefit of the participants.50 The SIT itself 
                                                
44 Makgola Makololo, “The impact of Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment employee share 
schemes,” MBA thesis, University of Pretoria, 2012, 3-4; Jonas, 33. 
45 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to “trust” in this dissertation refers to a SIT. 
46 Isaacman, 11. 
47 Bezuidenhout, 95-95; Jonas, 33.  
48 Jonas, 33 – 36 discusses the relevant provisions of the Companies Act in more detail. This section 
above is aimed at providing an overview as to the rationale behind the introduction of SITs, as well as to 
provide an overview of the typical functioning of a SIT so the tax consequences thereof may be 
understood more clearly.  
49 Butler, 12; Jonas, 35. 
50 Isaacman, 12; Jonas, 35. 
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is not aimed at producing income.51 A SIT typically options the company shares for the 
benefit of participants in one of two manners: either the SIT purchases shares on the 
open market, or the company issues shares directly to the SIT.52 
The employee share incentive scheme allows for the granting of a loan to the participant 
as a means of financing the purchase of the incentive (whether shares, options or units). 
The loan will typically be secured, with the acquired incentive acting as the required 
collateral for the repayment of the loan. The dividends to which the participant may 
become entitled over the repayment period of the loan, will be applied by the SIT and set 
off against the interest accrued on the loan and thereafter on the capital amount.53  
2.3.3 Vesting 
In the event where an employee share incentive ‘vests’54, the participant obtains a non-
forfeitable right over the incentive. This means that the incentive is no longer subject to 
any suspensive or resolutive conditions and that the participant will be able to freely 
dispose of his or her incentive as he or she sees fit. In the instance of restricted equity 
instruments (as defined in the ITA, vesting will occur on the date on which all the 
restrictions imposed upon the employee share incentive falls away and the participant is 
free to sell his or her shares.55 
Employee share incentives are often subject to certain vesting conditions, or, in other 
words, conditions which places restrictions on the incentive until such time as the 
conditions are either met, or the incentives are forfeited.56 Vesting conditions are typically 
suited to the needs of the company and the nature of the award, i.e. where the award of 
employee share incentives are made purely for purposes of the retention of an employee, 
the award is likely to only be subject to the employee’s continued employment with the 
company (“service condition”).57 Incentives are further also typically subject to 
                                                
51 Ibid. 
52 Isaacman, 12; Butler, 12; Jonas, 35. 
53 Ibid. 
54 In determining the tax consequences of employee share incentive schemes, specifically the point at 
which the benefits received in terms of these schemes are taxed, it is important to understand the concept 
of vesting. 
55 Isaacman, 13. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid; Bezuidenhout, 11-12. 
 17 
 
performance conditions, whether of a financial or non-financial nature which ensures that 
employees are motivated to drive the performance of their respective companies.58 
Awards of employee share incentives are typically subject to a mixture of the vesting 
conditions as set out above, which conditions are typically in place for a pre-determined 
period of time.  
2.3.4 Settlement mechanisms 
Incentive awards across the different schemes are most commonly settled either in equity 
(where a participant receives actual company shares upon the vesting of the award), or 
in cash, which cash amount is derived from the share price of a company share.59 
Cash-settled schemes have the advantage of not causing dilution of the shareholding of 
a company’s existing shareholders. On the other hand, businesses that typically do not 
have a high free cash flow, would have difficulty having to settle awards in cash.  
Equity-settled schemes have the benefit of providing participants with a share in the 
ownership in their respective companies, which in turn should increase the motivation of 
the employees to drive the growth and success of their respective companies.60 This is 
of particular relevance in broad-based employee share schemes where the purpose of 
the scheme is to provide previously disadvantages employees with the opportunity to hold 
shares in their employer company. 
2.4 Common types of schemes 
Employee share incentive schemes have evolved over the years, both as a result of the 
needs of the various companies, as well as to ensure that the structures of these schemes 
remained as tax efficient as possible in light of the changes to income tax legislation.  
Although a variety of employee share incentive schemes are found in the market today, 
studies61 have indicated that the most prevalent schemes which make use of a SIT, are: 
share option schemes, share purchase schemes, phantom share schemes, restricted 
                                                
58 Jonas, 37; Bezuidenhout, 11-12. See also the King IV Code on Corporate Governance for South Africa: 
A guide to the application of King IV: Governance of remuneration, 5. 
59 Jonas, 36. 
60 Global Equity Insights, 2017. 
61 Global Equity Insights, 2017, 3 and 9; Jonas, 12; Bezuidenhout, 3. 
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share schemes and BBBEE schemes. This section will focus on the aforementioned 
schemes. 
2.4.1 Share purchase scheme 
In order to understand the evolution of the various share incentive schemes over time, 
one must commence the analysis of a common share incentive scheme utilising a SIT by 
exploring a traditional share purchase scheme.  
A share purchase scheme consist of an employee SIT, set up by the employer company 
for the benefits of its employees. The SIT will acquire the required number of shares 
allotted to participants by either subscribing to shares or by purchasing shares on the 
market.62 The SIT will finance this acquisition by way of a loan granted to the trust by the 
employer company.63 
Participants are offered the opportunity to purchase a predetermined number of company 
shares from the SIT, usually at a price equal to the market value of the shares on the date 
on which the offer is made to the employees.64 The participants typically finance this 
purchase by way of a loan account in terms of which the employees where indebted to 
the SIT, with repayment of the loan occurring over tranches. The shares purchased by 
the participant act as security for the loan.65 
The ownership of the purchased shares, as well as other inherent shareholder rights such 
as dividends and voting rights that attach to the shares, are transferred to the participant 
upon the acquisition of the shares. Typically, the dividends payable with regards to the 
shares and which accrue to the participant, are used by the SIT to set off the loan until 
the loan is extinguished.66 
                                                
62 Isaacman, 16; Jonas, 4; Butler, 13. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Jonas, 40. 
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2.4.2 Option-type schemes 
2.4.2.1 Overview 
Option-type schemes generally fall into two categories: a traditional share option scheme, 
or a share appreciation rights scheme. Both share option schemes and share 
appreciation rights schemes generally require the participant to remain in the employ of 
the company throughout the vesting period of the award.67 Where the participant’s 
employment terminates before vesting, awards may be forfeited in their entirety, 
depending on the reasons for the termination of employment.68  
Option-type schemes have the advantage of driving share price growth in the company 
as participants to these schemes will only benefit where the market value of an option-
type incentive on the exercise date exceeds the market value on the grant date, as the 
participant will share in the growth. A disadvantage is that, where the share price at 
exercise is lower than the share price at grant, the options or share appreciation rights 
will be “out-of-the-money” and will hold no value to the participants, thereby rendering the 
retention and reward element of these schemes ineffective.  
Option-type schemes are particularly popular with companies that are in a growth phase, 
or companies that have a trend of constant share price growth, or companies that wish to 
drive the growth in the share price. 
2.4.2.2 Share Option Schemes 
Employees in the company are offered the right to purchase a fixed number of company 
shares at a fixed price by either the company or by a SIT. The price will typically be the 
price of a share at the award date. The options granted to the participant are typically 
exercisable over a pre-determined period of time, often ranging between three years and 
seven years. Upon the exercise of the option, the participant will pay the full amount of 
the options, determined at the price as at award date.69 Once the participant has paid the 
full price, the full ownership of the shares will be transferred to him or her.70 There is no 
                                                
67 Isaacman, 16. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Jonas, 39-40. 
70 Isaacman, 16. 
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obligation on the participant to exercise his or her options. The participant will receive no 
dividends or voting rights until such time as the option is exercised, the full amount paid 
and the ownership of the shares is transferred to the participant. 
The exercise of the share options is typically restricted until such time as the vesting 
period has lapsed, which could occur either in tranches, or at once. Subsequent to the 
lapse of the vesting period, the participant will be eligible exercise his or her option over 
a period of time (the exercise period). The participants are typically free to exercise their 
options at any time during the exercise period, thereby taking advantage of the highest 
possible share price.71 
2.4.2.3 Share appreciation rights 
Similar to share options, share appreciations rights are awarded to the participant at the 
market value at the grant date. Share appreciation rights differ from share options since 
participants do not have to pay to receive shares in the company. The participant will be 
eligible to receive the net gains of the growth in the market value upon the exercise date. 
2.4.3 Phantom share plan 
A phantom share scheme, as the name indicates, differs from the share purchase scheme 
and option-type schemes set out above in that the participants to the scheme do not 
receive a right to acquire actual company shares. Instead, participants to a phantom 
share scheme are awarded a number of units or “phantom shares” by either the company 
or through the use of a SIT. The value of these phantom shares will be derived from the 
value of the underlying share capital of the company.72  
The phantom shares may be subject to performance conditions as well as a service 
conditions. Upon the vesting of the phantom shares, the participant will receive an amount 
equal to the market value of the shares at the vesting date. The participant therefore has 
the benefit of sharing in the growth in the company and the motivation to grow the share 
price of the company, as an increased share price ultimately benefits the participant upon 
the vesting date.  
                                                
71 Jonas, 40. 
72 Jonas, 5. 
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Participants in a phantom share scheme may also receive dividend equivalents for the 
duration of the vesting period which in turn further aligns the participant’s interests to that 
of the shareholders of the company.73 Dividend equivalents are amounts distributed to 
the participants equal in value to the dividends which they would have received had they 
held actual equity shares in the company from which these dividend equivalents were 
derived.74  
2.4.4 BBBEE employee share scheme 
In order to understand and fully appreciate the impact of the amendments to the anti-
avoidance provisions in the ITA upon a BBBEE employee share ownership scheme, one 
must briefly explore the rationale and purpose behind the implementation of these 
schemes.75 
The concept of BBBEE was introduced as a mechanism through which people and 
communities previously oppressed under the apartheid regime would be transformed and 
uplifted. In 2003, as part of the government’s legislative framework for the transformation 
of the South African economy, the BBBEE Strategy was introduced as a prelude to the 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003.  
Following the implementation of the BBBEE Act, the government introduced the BBBEE 
Codes of Good Practice in February of 2007 as a framework through which BBBEE is 
implemented. A company’s BBBEE status is assessed using a scorecard, in terms of 
which the company is awarded points compliance with different aspects of BBBEE. A high 
BBBEE score is beneficial to a company, in particular in the context of preferential 
procurement.76 
The BBBEE scorecard contains various elements, one of which being ownership (DTI, 
2007). As such, since the implementation of BBBEE, companies have aimed to address 
                                                
73 Isaacman, 18. 
74 These dividend equivalents to not arise from a participant’s inherent right to dividends in respect of an 
actual company share, but rather on a contractual basis and/or on the discretion of the company.  
75 In order for BBBEE schemes to contribute to the available BBBEE ownership points, the schemes must 
meet a list of predetermined criteria as contained in the Codes of Good Practice. The aforementioned 
criteria does not form part of the scope of this study and, as such, is not addressed in detail, safe in 
instances as pertains to answering the research question(s). 
76 Richard Ramplin, “Viability of a BBBEE Employee Share Trusts: A Case Study of an Engineering 
Consulting Firm,” MPhil thesis, University of Cape Town, 2016, 3. 
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this element and better their BBBEE ratings through the implementation of employee 
share incentive schemes. These schemes are predominantly run through the use of a 
SIT, in terms of which shares are issued to employees identified to be of previously 
disadvantaged backgrounds.77 The employee shares are “locked in” for a predetermined 
period of time, meaning that the employees cannot freely dispose of their shares.78 
The SIT will acquire shares in the company, either by way of a fresh issue of shares to 
the SIT, or by way of purchasing the shares. In the instances where the SIT is required 
to purchase the share, one typically finds that the company grants a loan to the SIT 
through which the purchase of shares is financed, where after the SIT is required to repay 
the loan amount before any dividends can flow through to the participants.79  
Participants, upon accepting the units, are immediately entitled to: 
1. their share of the dividends received by the SIT; 
2. their proportional right to the net capital proceeds upon the realisation of the 
shares; and 
3. a right to the underlying shares in the SIT upon the expiry of the lock-in period. 
2.5 Conclusion  
The aim of this chapter was to provide the necessary context for the discussions in 
chapters 3 and 4 with regards to the anti-avoidance provisions in section 8C, section 
10(1)(k)(i) and the Eighth Schedule which impact on employee share incentive schemes 
operating through SITs by considering the most prevalent employee share incentive 
schemes in South Africa which utilise SITs. 
This chapter explored the rationale behind companies adopting share incentive schemes 
and the key variable features of employee share incentive schemes. It also set out the 
salient features of the most prevalent employee share incentive schemes which typically 
make use of a SIT.  
                                                
77 Makololo, 3. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ramplin, 4-5. 
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As is clear from the discussion above, employee share incentive schemes are common 
in South Africa and have evolved over time due in part to the changes in income tax 
legislation impacting adversely upon these schemes and the benefits which participants 
derive therefrom. The most prevalent employee share incentive schemes which are run 
through trusts are share purchase schemes, share option schemes, deferred delivery 
schemes and phantom share schemes. 
In order to understand:  
1. how the various changes in South African income tax legislation over the past 
decade affected how participants to the above employee share incentive schemes 
operating through SITs are taxed in terms of section 8C, section 10(1)(k)(i) and the 
Eighth Schedule; and  
2. whether any anomalies were created by and/or addressed by the amendments to 
the anti-avoidance provisions;  
one must proceed to examine the development of these anti-avoidance provisions 
impacting on the above schemes operating through SITs over the last decade. This is 
done in Chapter 3 below. 
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Chapter 3: Anti-avoidance provisions impacting on employee share incentive 
schemes run through trusts 
3.1 Introduction 
In an attempt to prevent employee share incentive schemes, particularly those operating 
through share incentive trusts (“SITs”) being used as mechanisms through which 
employees could avoid paying income tax on equity-based remuneration, various anti-
avoidance provisions were introduced in section 8C, section 10(1)(k)(i) and the Eighth 
Schedule of the ITA over the past decade. 
This chapter aims to explore the development of these anti-avoidance provisions 
impacting on employee share incentive schemes operating through SITs over the last 
decade, with a focus on identifying anomalies created by and/or addressed by the 
amendments to these provisions.  
In order to achieve this objective, this chapter sets out the history and original purpose 
behind the implementation of the key anti-avoidance provisions contained in section 8C, 
section 10(1)(k)(i) and the Eighth Schedule the ITA which impact on the tax 
consequences of employee share incentive schemes operating through trusts. 
The significant amendments to these provisions over the past decade is further explored. 
The most recent amendments to and the current wording of the anti-avoidance provisions 
in section 8C and section 10(1)(k)(i) is also explored. This chapter also sets out the 
implication of the wording of the current anti-avoidance provisions in section 8C and 
section 10(1)(k)(i) as they stand on the employee share incentive schemes as set out in 
Chapter 2. Comments on the effectiveness of these anti-avoidance provisions in 
achieving the purpose for which they were implemented are included.  
This chapter further identifies anomalies created by the amendments to the anti-
avoidance provisions in order to provide the context required to understand the discussion 
in Chapter 4 below in respect of the perceived anomalies which still persist in relation to 
the CGT implications of employee share incentive schemes operating through SITs. 
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3.2 The tax implications of share incentive schemes –section 8C 
3.2.1 Background to the introduction of section 8C 
Equity-based incentive schemes have developed over the years so as to provide a 
mechanism through which employees are awarded compensation in the form of equity in 
their employer companies. Prior to 1969, these schemes were an effective way of 
providing employees with remuneration in the form of equity which resulted in the 
employees having to pay minimal tax costs. The type of schemes employed varied, but 
typical schemes included restricted shares schemes, deferred delivery schemes, share 
option schemes and convertible debentures.80  
In 1969, section 8A of the ITA was introduced81 in an attempt to address and regulate the 
tax consequences of equity-based incentive schemes so as to try and ensure that 
employees do not avoid paying the income tax on equity-based remuneration. In terms 
of this provision, gains resulting from the exercise, cession or release of a right to acquire 
a marketable security82 were to be included in the income of the taxpayer if the taxpayer 
obtained this right as a result of the services he or she rendered to the company.  
Although section 8A made strides in reducing the tax benefits participants to share 
incentive schemes were enjoying prior its introduction, certain loopholes remained. Over 
time, employee share incentive schemes continued to evolve in an effort to remain as tax 
efficient as possible and to ensure that employees paid as little income tax as possible.83  
In light of the evolution of employee share incentive schemes following the introduction 
of section 8A, it was determined in 2004 that section 8A had become ineffective in 
achieving the aim for which it was originally enacted. Specifically, the Explanatory 
                                                
80 National Treasury, “Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue laws Amendment Bill, 2004,” 10, 
accessed on 4 April 2018, http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/ExplMemo/LAPD-LPrep-EM-2004- 
02%20-%20%20Explanatory%20Memorandum%20Revenue%20Laws%20Amendment%20Bill%202004. 
pdf. 
81 Section 8A of the ITA was inserted by section 11 of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 89 of 1969. 
82 A marketable security was defined in section 8A(10) as “any security, stock, debenture, share, option or 
other interest capable of being sold in a share-market or exchange or otherwise.”  
83 Jonas, 21. 
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Memorandum issued by the South African Revenue Service (hereafter referred to as 
“SARS”) in 2004, stated the following: 84 
1. Firstly, section 8A was deemed to have failed in staying abreast and properly 
addressing the variety of equity-based incentive schemes that had developed 
since its inception.  
2. Secondly, section 8A “fail[ed] to fully capture all the appreciation associated with 
the marketable security as ordinary income.”  
3. Finally, tax advantages associated with these equity-based incentive schemes 
were contrary to the concept of “vertical equity”.85 The Explanatory Memorandum 
emphasised that top management should not receive the fringe benefit of being 
taxed at lower rates as a result of receiving a portion of their remuneration in equity, 
when lower level employees who were purely salary-based were subject to full 
income tax on their salaries.86 
In light of this, the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 32 of 2004 resulted in two significant 
amendments to the ITA:  
1. Section 8A was amended by section 7 of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 32 
of 2004 to only apply to rights obtained by the taxpayer before 26 October 2004 in 
respect of services rendered or to be rendered.  
2. The Revenue Laws Amendment Act, 32 of 2004 further amended the ITA in 
section 8(1) by the insertion of section 8C.87 Section 8C came into effect on 26 
October 2004 and is applicable “in respect of any equity instrument acquired on or 
after that date, otherwise than by way of the exercise of any right granted before 
that date and in respect of which section 8A applies”.88  
                                                
84 National Treasury, 2004, 10. 
85 This concept requires employees to be taxed at their top marginal rate on their earnings, as opposed to 
the maximum capital gains rate (National Treasury, 2010, 17). 
86 National Treasury, 2004, 10. 
87 For detailed discussions with regards to the introduction of section 8C, refer to Jonas and 
Bezuidenhout respectively.  
88 Section 8(1) of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act, 32 of 2004. 
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One of the main aims of this section is to ensure that the awards of restricted equity 
instruments received by employees are taxed as growth-related salaries at the 
employee’s marginal rate and to prevent the gain received by the employee as being 
artificially classified as a capital gain.89 Section 8C places an obligation on a taxpayer to 
include in his or her income for a year of assessment any gain (or loss) determined in 
terms of section 8C(2) and which gain arose from the vesting90 of a restricted equity 
instrument during the year of assessment. The aforementioned is subject to the taxpayer 
having acquired the restricted equity instrument by virtue of his or her employment.  
A restricted equity instrument, as emphasised by the Explanatory Memorandum, 
“represents an interest in the equity shares underlying the scheme that is held either 
directly or through a derivative mechanism. The retention or acquisition, by a scheme 
participant, of the benefits flowing from the scheme, e.g. dividends, is subject to 
suspensive or resolutive terms or conditions.”91 As such, where an employee receives a 
gain upon the vesting of an incentive, whether in the form of equity or in cash, that gain 
must be included in the employee’s income for the year of assessment. 
3.2.2 Significant amendments to anti-avoidance provisions impacting on 
employee SITs over the past decade 
Section 8C has evolved significantly since its enactment in 2004 and remains the primary 
provision in the ITA addressing the taxation of restricted equity instruments and ensuring 
that gains from such instruments are included in the ordinary income of employees.92 The 
                                                
89 National Treasury, “Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2010,” 17, 
accessed 5 June 2018, http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/ExplMemo/LAPD-LPrep-EM-2010-
01%20-%20Explanatory%20Memorandum%20Taxation%20Laws%20Amendment%20Bill%202010.pdf. 
90 Section 8C differs from various other anti-avoidance provisions, in that it aims to defer the point of 
taxation, rather than accelerate it. The point of taxation in terms of section 8C is intended to be at the 
point where an employee’s award vests and the employee is able to freely dispose of the equity 
instrument as all the restrictions upon the equity instrument has fallen away.  
91 National Treasury, “Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2016,” 14, 
accessed 30 April 2018, http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/ExplMemo/LAPD-LPrep-EM-2016-
02%20-%20EM%20on%20the%20Taxation%20Laws%20Amendment%20Bill%2017B%20of%202016% 
2015%20December%202016.pdf. 
92 National Treasury, “Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill, 2008,” 22 
accessed 28 April 2018, http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/ExplMemo/LAPD-LPrep-EM-2008-
01%20-%20Explanatory%20Memorandum%20Revenue%20Laws%20Amendment%20Bill%202008.pdf.  
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significant amendments set out below are focused on those amendments over the past 
decade which relate specifically to anti-avoidance provisions impacting on SITs. 
In 2008, anti-avoidance measures were introduced to regulate the tax consequences of 
employee share incentive schemes run through SITs. The rationale provided for this 
amendment to the ITA, was that employee share incentive schemes had developed in 
such a way so as to avoid the application of section 8C on artificial technical grounds.93 
Specifically, a number of schemes had evolved so as to utilise SITs as vehicles in which 
shares were held and in which a participant did not obtain a right to the actual underlying 
shares, but rather a right to the value of the shares held in the SIT. This resulted in 
participants having the advantage of obtaining the value of what would otherwise have 
constituted a certain number of shares, without the burden of having to include the value 
in their gross income (since section 8C did not find application due to there being no 
award of equity shares). 
Section 11 of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 60 of 2008, amended section 8C by 
inserting section 8C(1A) and by amending subsection (7). The latter in effect widened the 
ambit of section 8C as it amended the definition of “equity instrument” through section 
8C(7)(c) through the inclusion of the following: 
“any contractual right or obligation the value of which is determined directly or 
indirectly with reference to a share or member’s interest.” 
The above amendment resulted in section 8C finding application where the participant 
received an interest in a trust, even in instances where the right pertains solely to the 
value of the underlying shares held in the trust and not to the shares themselves.  
The Explanatory Memorandum 2016 highlights the fact that section 8C is based on “the 
implicit assumption that the full value of the equity shares underlying a restricted equity 
instrument will vest in the employee when the restrictions fall away.”94 This is, however, 
not always the case. Various incentive scheme structures were designed in such a way 
so as to either liquidate the value of the underlying scheme shares, either in part or wholly, 
by disposing of or redeeming the underlying shares before the shares became 
                                                
93 Ibid. 
94 National Treasury, 2016, 14-15. 
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unrestricted and distributing the value to the participant in the form of a dividend. Aside 
from the fact that these schemes allowed a participant to benefit by paying less tax on the 
distributions received, it also lessened the value of the underlying shares which in turn 
lead to a lower tax rate.95 
As a result, further amendments were made to section 8C96 in 2016 to further prevent the 
characterisation of amounts received by virtue of employment as capital gains or as 
dividends.97 Section 13(1) of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 15 of 2016 amended 
section 8C(1A) to extend its application to include amounts received by or accrued to a 
taxpayer during a year of assessment in respect of a restricted equity instrument, 
provided that the amount does not constitute:98 
1. A dividend in respect of the restricted equity instrument; 
2. A return of capital by way of distribution of a restricted equity instrument; or 
3. An amount that must be taken into account in respect of a restricted equity 
instrument for purposes of section 8C. 
The wording of this section makes it clear that, where a SIT disposes of a restricted equity 
instrument and vests the profits in the participants, the amount received by the 
participants must be included in their taxable income for the year of assessment. In fact, 
the section is worded in such a way as to include all amounts received by the participant 
in respect of the restricted equity shares in the participant’s income, save for three 
exceptions. Amongst others, dividends in respect of the restricted equity instrument are 
specifically excluded from the participant’s income and will be subject to dividends tax. 
The above amendment to the ITA gave rise to an unintended further anomaly with regards 
to the interaction between section 8C(1A) and paragraph 80(2A) of the Eighth Schedule. 
The anomaly and the relevant steps taken to attempt and address the anomaly is 
discussed below. 
                                                
95 Ibid. 
96 The 2016 legislative cycle also brought related amendments to section 10(1)(k)(i) of the Act. Refer to 
the sections below. 
97 National Treasury, 2016, 14-16. 
98 Ibid, 16. 
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The 2017 legislative cycle did not bring about any further significant changes to provisions 
in section 8C.  
3.2.3 Conclusion: Effectiveness of the anti-avoidance provision 
Section 8C manages to successfully encapsulate any and all amounts received by or 
accrued to an employee in respect of a restricted equity instrument which do not fall within 
any of the exceptions. In respect of employee SITs, this section appears to successfully 
prevent amounts being characterised as capital gains or dividends by specifically 
including amounts received by virtue of the employee’s employment and participation in 
these schemes as income.  
It is clear from section 8C, as it currently reads, that an amount received by or accrued to 
an employee by virtue of his employment in respect of a restricted equity instrument, will 
be included in the employee’s taxable income for the year of assessment, irrespective of 
whether the amount is derived from a gain arising from the vesting of the equity instrument 
in the employee, or the profits of the sale of the equity instruments which are vested in 
the employee. This means that, irrespective of whether an employee participates in an 
equity-settled employee share incentive scheme or a phantom cash settled incentive 
scheme, the gains received by the employee by virtue of his employment will be taxed as 
income in the hands of the employee. 
Following the above amendment and the current wording of section 8C(1A), one must 
explore the wording of the anti-avoidance provision relating to dividends which should be 
read in tandem to the above section 8C(1A), as it is clear from the above that only 
dividends, as defined by the ITA, will be excluded from the income of a participant for 
purposes of section 8C(1A). 
3.3 The exemptions to income tax in respect of dividends – section 10(1)(k)(i) 
3.3.1 Background 
Dividends are included in a taxpayer’s gross income by way of paragraph (k) of the gross 
income definition in section 1(1) of the ITA. Dividends may be exempt from normal income 
in terms of section 10(1)(k)(i). The proviso to section 10(1)(k)(i) sets out various 
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exceptions to the exemption and has been the subject of amendment in numerous 
legislative cycles. 
Prior to 2011, participants to employee share incentive schemes had the advantage of 
receiving exempt dividends by virtue of their participation in a scheme. In light of this tax 
benefit, various share incentive schemes were set up in a manner as to allow the 
employees participating in the scheme to receive dividends exempt from income tax, 
without the participant having any other participation rights.99  
Phantom share incentive schemes, for example, were put in place in terms of which a 
participant was granted a number of phantom shares or a number of units which were 
linked to the value of the company’s equity share capital. Employees in these schemes 
were then able to receive dividend equivalents, being amounts distributed to the 
participants equal in value to the dividends which they would have received had they held 
actual equity shares in the company from which these dividend equivalents were derived. 
The participants had the benefit of receiving these dividend equivalents exempt from 
income tax, whilst not holding any actual equity shares. Such schemes were often 
structured in such a manner so as to convert a participant’s salary into dividends which 
in turn significantly reduced a participant’s tax liability, as these dividends were exempt 
from income tax.100 
In order to address the avoidance of income tax resulting from such schemes, section 
10(1)(k)(i) was amended and paragraph (dd) was introduced in 2010. 
3.3.2 Significant amendments to anti-avoidance provisions impacting on 
employee SITs over the past decade 
3.3.2.1 Paragraph (dd) 
Section 18(1)(m) of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 7 of 2010 introduced paragraph 
(dd) in an attempt to aid the prevention of taxpayers masking their salaries through the 
use of employee share incentive schemes that would result in the taxpayer being taxed 
at a lower rate (in the instance of capital gains), or not at all. Paragraph (dd) excluded 
                                                
99 Participation rights are rights which are linked to the share, such as voting rights and the right to 
receive dividends. See Jonas, 52. 
100 Jonas, 52-53. 
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from the dividend exemption in section 10(1)(k)(i) dividends in respect of section 8C 
equity instruments, unless the restricted equity instrument constituted an “equity share” 
or the dividend constituted an equity instrument for purposes of section 8C. 
In addition to the introduction of paragraph (dd), the definition of “equity share capital” 
was substituted by section 6(1)(g) of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 7 of 2010 for a 
definition of “equity share” which meant, in relation to any company, “any share or similar 
interest in that company, excluding any share or similar interest that does not carry any 
right to participate beyond a specified amount in distribution”. This meant that, where a 
participant in an employee share incentive scheme operating through a SIT only had a 
right to receive distributions in respect of the scheme, but held no other participation 
rights, the participant’s interest in the SIT did not extend beyond the right to “a specified 
amount in distribution.”  
The purpose of paragraph (dd) and the substitution of the definition of “equity share” was 
specifically to prevent income being disguised as dividends which are taxed at a lower 
rate. This was aimed at addressing preference share schemes, which were set up in such 
a way as to introduce a special class of shares which gives the employee the right to 
receive larger than normal dividends.101 As a result of these 2010 amendments, 
preference shares no longer qualify as “equity shares” which in turn results in dividends 
received in respect of preference shares no longer being exempt from income tax. 
By excluding shares or similar interests that do not carry rights other than the right to 
receive specified amounts in distributions from the definition of “equity share”, this 
definition effectively excluded any distributions received by participants to employee 
share incentive schemes operating through SITs that were not received in respect of 
actual equity shares as defined from being exempt from income tax.  
The introduction of paragraph (dd) and the substitution of the definition of “equity share” 
had the unintended consequence of negatively impacting upon employee share incentive 
schemes operating through SITs where participants held shares through the SIT. The 
                                                
101 National Treasury, “Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 2011,” 15, 
accessed 1 May 2018, http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/ExplMemo/LAPD-LPrep-EM-2011-
02%20-%20Explanatory%20Memorandum%20Taxation%20Laws%20Amendment%20Bill%202011.pdf. 
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2010 amendments to paragraph (dd) and the definition of “equity share” inadvertently 
resulted in dividends received by participants on shares held for their benefit in a SIT 
being taxed as income. 102  
In an attempt to narrow the extensive application of paragraph (dd), section 28(1)(n) of 
the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 24 of 2011 further amended paragraph (dd) so as to 
include a carve-out provision in terms of which dividends paid to participants in respect 
of section 8C restricted equity instruments remained exempt from tax, provided that the 
restricted equity instrument constituted an interest in an employee SIT holding only equity 
shares.103  
“(dd) to any dividend in respect of a restricted equity instrument as defined in 
section 8C to the extent that the restricted equity instrument was acquired in 
the circumstances contemplated in section 8C, unless- 
(A) The restricted equity instrument constitutes an equity share, other than an 
equity share that would have constituted a hybrid equity instrument as 
defined in section 8E (1) but for the three-year period contemplated in that 
definition;” 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 24 of 2011 
emphasised that the intention behind paragraph (dd) was never to tax the dividends 
receivable by participants on equity shares held by an employee SIT for their benefit.104 
Paragraph (dd) is of particular importance in respect to employee share incentive 
schemes operating through SITs as it addresses dividends in respect of restricted equity 
instruments.105 Whereas section 8C governs the tax consequences arising on the vesting 
of restricted equity instruments which were acquired by virtue of the participant’s 
employment, the dividends which the employee receives by virtue of those restricted 
equity instruments are taxed as ordinary income in the hands of the participant unless the 
dividend falls within one of the three exceptions cited above.106  
                                                
102 Ibid. 
103 Jonas, 54. 
104 National Treasury, 2011, 14 -15. 
105 Madeleine Stiglingh et al., Silke on South African Income Tax 2017 (LexisNexis, 2018), 81. 
106 Ibid. 
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Therefore, where participants receive dividends on restricted equity instruments and the 
restricted equity instruments qualify as “equity shares” for purposes of the ITA; or where 
the restricted equity instrument constitute an interest in a SIT where the SIT holds only 
equity shares, the dividends will be exempt from income tax. Where a participant in a 
scheme is eligible to receive dividend equivalents, those dividend equivalents will not be 
classified as dividends in respect of qualifying equity shares and will as such be taxed as 
ordinary income in the hands of the participant. 
3.3.2.2 Paragraph (ii) 
Following the amendments to paragraph (dd), section 23(1)(p) of the Taxation Laws 
Amendment Act 31 of 2013 introduced paragraph (ii) to section 10(1)(k)(i). The 
Explanatory Memorandum stated that the anti-avoidance rule in paragraph (dd) was 
deemed to be too narrow as it only targeted dividends derived from non-equity shares. 
This meant that employee share incentive schemes could hold equity shares for the 
primary purpose of generating dividends for the participants. These dividends were 
essentially disguised salaries and the participants never obtained ownership of the 
shares.107 
The Explanatory Memorandum further emphasised the following important policy 
consideration: 
“According to policy, if an employer pays an employee for services rendered, 
the amount should be included in gross income and taxed at marginal rates 
irrespective of how the employer funded the payment. Furthermore, the same 
tax consequences should flow irrespective of whether the payment was made 
directly or indirectly by the employer to the employee (e.g. facilitated through 
an employee share trust).”108 
Paragraph (ii) was therefore introduced to target dividends paid to participants in respect 
of their employment or services rendered and to ensure that these amounts were 
appropriately taxed as income and not as dividends. Paragraph (ii) was structured in such 
                                                
107 National Treasury, “Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 2013,” 25, 
accessed on 4 May 2018, http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/ExplMemo/LAPD-LPrep-EM-2013-
02%20-%20Explanatory%20Memorandum%20Taxation%20Laws%20Amendment%20Bill%202013.pdf.  
108 National Treasury, 2013, 25. 
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a way as to not negatively affect bona fide employee share incentive schemes as is clear 
from the wording below: 
“(ii) to any dividend received by or accrued to a person in respect of services 
rendered or to be rendered or in respect of or by virtue of employment or the 
holding of any office, other than a dividend received or accrued in respect of a 
restricted equity instrument as defined in section 8C held by that person or in 
respect of a share held by that person.” 
Paragraph (ii) has been the subject of much debate as it addresses the tax consequences 
of dividends paid in respect of services rendered.109 In order to prevent income for 
services rendered as being disguised as a dividend, such dividends received as a result 
of services rendered will not be exempt from normal tax, unless the dividend is received 
in respect of a restricted equity instrument as defined in section 8C, in which instance the 
tax consequences of that dividend will be governed under paragraph (dd) set out 
above.110 
The interaction between paragraphs (dd) and (ii) is intended to curb the avoidance of tax 
through the characterisation of income as dividends, whilst at the same time offering 
specific exclusions so as to not penalise employee beneficiaries to employee share 
incentive schemes on any dividends they may receive. 
3.3.2.3 Paragraph (jj) 
The ITA was further amended by section 23(1)(d) of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 
15 of 2016 so as to introduce paragraph (jj) to section 10(1)(k)(i) in order to exclude 
certain dividends from the tax exemption on certain dividends. Paragraph (jj) was 
specifically aimed at combatting the various preference share structures that arose in an 
attempt to mitigate the tax consequences of section 8C.111  
In terms of these schemes, participants were able to receive larger than normal income 
in the form of dividends which were then taxed as dividends, rather than at the employee’s 
                                                
109 See the Explanatory Memorandums issued during 2015 and 2016 respectively for a discussion on the 
problems surrounding the dividends exemption. 
110 Stiglingh et al, 80. 
111 National Treasury, 2016, 15-16. 
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marginal tax rate. Paragraph (jj) applies notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (dd) 
and (ii) and excludes from the exemption from income tax, dividends in respect of 
restricted equity instruments if the dividend is derived directly or indirectly from (or 
constitutes): 
1. An amount transferred or applied by accompany as consideration for the 
acquisition or redemption of any share in the company; 
2. An amount received or accrued in anticipation or in the course of the winding up, 
liquidation, deregistration or final termination of a company; or 
3. An equity instrument that is not a restricted equity instrument as defined in section 
8C, that will on vesting be subject to that section. 
3.3.2.4 Paragraph (kk) 
Paragraph (kk) was introduced into the ITA during the 2017 legislative cycle with the aim 
of further refining the existing anti-avoidance measures aimed at schemes where 
restricted shares held by participants are liquidated in return for an amount which 
constitutes a dividend.  
These paragraphs are specific anti-avoidance measures aimed at structures where 
employee beneficiaries receive a dividend in respect of restricted equity instruments 
which the employee received by virtue of his employment and which dividend constitutes 
a distribution of the value of the underlying shares which were liquidated before the 
restrictions fell away. It is important to note that paragraphs (jj) and (kk) override the 
provisions of paragraphs (dd) and (ii). The dividend will not be exempt from normal tax in 
the following instances:  
“to any dividend in respect of a restricted equity instrument as defined in 
section 8C that was acquired in the circumstances contemplated in section 8C 
(1) if that dividend is derived directly or indirectly from –  
(A) An amount transferred or applied by a company as consideration for the 
acquisition or redemption of any share in that company;  
(B) An amount received or accrued in anticipation or in the course of the 
winding up, liquidation, deregistration or final termination of a company.” 
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No further amendments were made to the other anti-avoidance paragraphs in 
section 10(1)(k)(i). 
3.3.3 Conclusion: Effectiveness of the anti-avoidance provision 
The anti-avoidance provisions impacting on employee share incentive schemes operating 
through SITs contained in section 10(1)(k)(i) appear to succeed in meeting their purpose 
and prevent the characterisation of employment income as exempt dividends when 
applied to the most common employee share incentive schemes in their standard form. 
Structures through which employees receive income disguised as larger-than-normal 
exempt dividends are no longer an effective way of characterising employment income 
as a dividend. The provisions ensure that dividends received by an participant by virtue 
of his employment will be excluded from the exemption from normal tax, unless the 
dividend is received or accrued in respect of a restricted equity instrument as defined in 
section 8C which is held by the employee (sub-paragraph (ii)).  
In respect of employee share incentive schemes, the above provisions result in dividend 
equivalents being taxed as normal income in the hands of the participant as these do not 
qualify as dividends received in respect of equity shares. Full-share type schemes and/or 
share option schemes where shares are acquired upfront, but remain subject to disposal 
restrictions, would enable the employee, as a shareholder, to receive dividends over the 
restricted period which will be exempt as these dividends would have been received in 
respect of an equity share. 
3.4 The taxation of capital gains – anti-avoidance provisions contained in the 
Eighth Schedule aimed at preventing income being characterised as a capital 
gain  
3.4.1 Background 
Capitals Gains Tax (hereafter referred to as “CGT”) was introduced into the ITA during 
the 2001 legislative cycle and its introduction impacted the manner in which employee 
share incentive schemes are taxed. The Explanatory Memorandum in setting out the 
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rationale for the (then) proposed amendments, noted the following as it pertains to trusts 
and the beneficiaries to trusts:112  
“a capital gain arising from the disposal of a trust asset will be taxable either in the 
hands of the trust or, where an attribution rule applies, in the hands of a beneficiary 
or a person who made a donation, settlement or other disposition to the trust.” 
The introduction of paragraph 80 of the Eighth Schedule in particular had a significant 
impact on employee SITs and the participants thereto. This provision was introduced to 
allow capital gains determined in respect of the disposals of trust assets to resident trust 
beneficiaries to be ignored in the hands of the trust, and to be treated as capital gains in 
the hands of the beneficiary. As such, the attribution of a capital gain to a beneficiary 
results in a lower effective tax rate in respect of capital gain, than a capital gain which is 
taxed in the hands of a trust, thereby benefiting the trust beneficiaries.113 
3.4.2 Significant amendments to anti-avoidance provisions impacting on 
employee SITs over the past decade 
Section 8C, as is clear from the discussion in 3.2 above, provides for the inclusion of the 
gains received from equity instruments in terms of participation in employee share 
incentive schemes in the participant’s gross income in the year of assessment when the 
equity instrument vests in the participant.  
In 2015, amendments were made to the ITA by the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 25 of 
2015 for the purpose of addressing the anomaly which existed in the interaction between 
the taxation of employee share incentive schemes operating through SITs in terms of 
section 8C and the attribution provisions contained in the Eighth Schedule relating to the 
timing of the disposal and the subsequent attribution of capital gains to the participants. 
                                                
112 National Treasury, “Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill, 2001,” 105 
accessed 30 April 2018, http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/ExplMemo/LAPD-LPrep-EM-2001-
01%20-%20%20Explanatory%20Memorandum%20Revenue%20Laws%20Amendment%20Bill%20200 
1.pdf. 
113 Ibid, 106. 
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Paragraph 11(2)(j) was originally inserted into the Eighth Schedule to the ITA to ensure 
that qualifying section 8C restricted equity instruments do not trigger a disposal event for 
purposes of CGT before the restrictions falling away on the vesting of the instrument.  
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill 2015 stated that it 
has become evident that paragraph 11(2)(j) of the Eighth Schedule, as it then stood, was 
being misinterpreted to mean that the disposal of equity instruments by a trust to an 
participant was a non-event for CGT purposes.114  
As such, the amendments sought to clarify that where an employee SIT disposes of equity 
instruments to a participant, the recognition of the capital gain in the SIT is deferred until 
the equity instruments vest for purposes of section 8C.115 
The ITA was subsequently amended as follows: 
1. Paragraph 11(2)(j) was deleted116 so as to address the misinterpretation of there 
being no disposal event by a trust.117 
2. Paragraph 13(1)(a)(iiB) was inserted118 so as to ensure that there is a disposal 
event where a trust grants a restricted equity instrument to a qualifying participant. 
The CGT implications are deferred until such time as the restricted equity 
instrument vests for purposes of section 8C.119 
3. Amendments were made to paragraph 80(1)120 which aimed to clarify the 
following:121 
a) Any gains which resulted from the employee SIT disposing of shares to 
participants, remained taxable in the trust and were not attributed to the 
participants.  
                                                
114 National Treasury, 2015, 10. 
115 National Treasury, 2015, 10. 
116 Amended by section 105(1)(b) of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 25 of 2015. 
117 National Treasury, 2015, 10. 
118 Inserted by section 107(1) of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 25 of 2015. 
119 National Treasury, 2015, 10-11. 
120 Amended by section 123(1)(a) of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 25 of 2015. 
121 National Treasury, 2015, 11. 
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b) Any gains which resulted in the instance where the trust sold the shares and 
vested the profits in the participants, constituted a section 8C gain in the hands 
of the participants as the gain qualified as a section 8C instrument by virtue of 
being a beneficial interest in the trust.  
4. Paragraph 80(2A)122 was inserted which intended to clarify that where the 
employee SIT disposes of the shares held in the trust and subsequently vests the 
profits in the hands of the participants, the provisions of paragraph 80(2)123 will not 
apply if the amount is taken into account for purposes of section 8C in the hands 
of the participants.124 
The above amendments, though made for purposes of addressing an anomaly in the ITA, 
were to a large extent unsuccessful, as is evidenced by the further amendments to the 
ITA which followed. 
During 2016, further amendments were introduced into section 8C125 and section 
10(1)(k)(i)126 by way of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 15 of 2016 so as to address 
situations where restricted equity instruments allocated to employees are liquidated in 
return for an amount equal in value to the shares which qualify as a dividend paid to 
employees, rather than as shares with embedded gain.  
The amendment resulted in the characterisation of amounts received by or accrued to 
participants through the liquidation of restricted equity instruments as remuneration where 
the liquidation occurs where the restrictions are still in place. The amounts paid to 
participants will therefore be included in the employee’s gross income and will be taxed 
at the employee’s marginal rate.127  
                                                
122 Amended by section 123(1)(b) of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 25 of 2015. 
123 Paragraph 80(2) states that any capital gain determined in respect of the disposal of an asset by a 
trust in a year of assessment during which the trust beneficiary who is a resident has a vested interest or 
acquires a vested interest in the capital gain, but not the asset, the disposal of which gave rise to the 
capital gain, the portion or whole of the gain that vests must be disregarded for CGT purposes in the 
hands of the trust. The gain is attributed to the beneficiary and must be taken into account for purposes of 
calculating the aggregate capital gain of the beneficiary in whom it vests.  
124 National Treasury, 2015, 11. 
125 Amended by section 13(1) of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 15 of 2016. 
126 Amended by section 23(1)(d) of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 15 of 2016. 
127 National Treasury, 2017, 13. 
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Following the above amendments, it soon became apparent that the 2015 amendments 
to the ITA in the form of paragraph 80(2A) overlapped with the 2016 amendments. Section 
8C(1A) was aimed at ensuring that the capital gain received by employees who are 
holders of restricted equity instruments are taxed as normal income, whereas paragraph 
80(2A) was aimed at preventing the “conduit principle” in respect of gains arising on the 
disposal of a trust asset which are vested in the participants, thereby resulting in the 
capital gains arising from a disposal of trust assets to participants being taxable in the 
hands of the trust and not in the hands of the participant where the gain is taxed as income 
in the hands of the participant for purposes of section 8C.128 
The interaction between these provisions caused unintended double taxation due to a 
capital gain arising from the disposal of shares by a trust being subject to CGT in the 
hands of the trust, and capital gains arising from the liquidation of a restricted share being 
subject to income tax in the hands of the participant.  
3.4.3 Most recent amendments 
The Taxation Laws Amendment Act 17 of 2017 attempted to rectify this unintended 
anomaly during the 2017 legislative cycle through inter alia the introduction of paragraph 
64E of the Eighth Schedule; further amendments to paragraph 80(2) and the deletion of 
paragraph 80(2A). While paragraph 80(1) remained unchanged during the 2017 
legislative cycle, the author has identified two anomalies that persist in the current 
wording of the anti-avoidance provisions in the Eighth Schedule and which impact on 
employee share incentive schemes operating through SITs. As a result hereof, an in-
depth exploration of the above amendments and the perceived anomalies is set out in 
Chapter 4 below, together with comments on the effectiveness of these provisions in 
achieving the purpose for which they were intended. 
3.5  Conclusion 
This chapter provided the reader with the history and original purpose behind the 
implementation of the key anti-avoidance provisions contained in sections 8C, 10(1)(k)(i) 
and the Eighth Schedule of the ITA which impacts on the tax consequences of employee 
                                                
128 Ibid. 
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share incentive schemes operating through SITs. It is clear that the aim of these 
provisions is to prevent income derived from the vesting of restricted equity instruments 
being classified as dividends or capital gains which are taxed at a lower rates. 
The anti-avoidance provisions discussed in this chapter have had a widespread impact 
on the tax consequences of employee share incentive schemes, particularly those 
schemes operated through a SIT. The provisions contained in section 8C and section 
10(1)(k)(i) appear to effectively fulfil their intended function, i.e. to prevent income derived 
from the vesting of restricted equity instruments as being classified as dividend and no 
further amendments to the ITA are deemed necessary in respect of these provisions.  
It is concluded that the amendments to the ITA during the 2015, 2016 and 2017 legislative 
cycles resulted in the creation of unintended anomalies with regards to employee share 
incentive schemes operating through SITs. These anomalies include double taxation 
which arose due to the 2015 and 2016 amendments in respect of the interaction between 
section 8C(1A) and the Eighth Schedule.  
The legislature attempted to address this specific anomaly during the 2017 legislative 
cycle has by removing paragraph 80(2A), amending paragraph 80(2) and by introducing 
paragraph 64E.129 There are however perceived anomalies which remain (and which will 
be discussed in Chapter 4) which should be addressed in order to ensure consistent 
application of the ITA to employee share incentive schemes operating through SITs.  
  
                                                
129 National Treasury, 2017, 12-14. 
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Chapter 4: Current anti-avoidance provisions of the Eighth Schedule: Do 
anomalies remain and how could these anomalies be addressed? 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The 2017 legislative cycle resulted in further amendments to the Eighth Schedule of the 
ITA in the form of paragraphs 64E and 80(2) for purposes of addressing the anomaly of 
unintended double taxation due to a capital gain arising from the disposal of shares by a 
SIT being subject to CGT in the hands of the SIT, and capital gains arising from the 
liquidation of a restricted share being subject to income tax in the hands of the participant.  
This chapter aims to:  
1. conduct an analysis of the perceived anomalies that still persist in relation to the 
CGT implications of employee share incentive schemes operating through share 
incentive trusts (“SITs”); and 
2. provide recommendations of possible amendments which could be made to the 
anti-avoidance provisions in the Eighth Schedule to address these anomalies. 
In order to satisfy the above objectives, this chapter commences with an analysis of the 
current wording of paragraphs 80(1), 80(2) and 64E of the Eighth Schedule in order to 
highlight the creation of the perceived anomalies and includes comments on the 
effectiveness of these provisions in achieving the aim for which they were implemented.  
The implications of these provisions for common employee share incentive scheme 
operating through SITs are examined by way of a case study in order to illustrate how 
participants under such schemes will be taxed. Recommendations on addressing these 
anomalies are offered. Finally, this chapter also provides an overview of National 
Treasury’s response to these anomalies as well as a brief discussion of the proposed 
2018 amendments to these provisions and whether these proposed amendments will 
address the perceived anomalies so as to determine whether South Africa should 
consider making further amendments to the ITA.  
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4.2 Perceived current anomalies found in the Eighth Schedule 
4.2.1 Paragraph 80(1) 
Paragraph 80(1) contains the general rule with regards the tax position where a trust 
distributes an asset to a beneficiary: The distribution of an asset by the trust to its 
beneficiary constitutes a disposal for purposes of paragraph 11 of the Eighth Schedule. 
The capital gain arising from the disposal of that asset is attributed to and taxable in the 
hands of the beneficiary as a connected person in relation to the trust.  
Paragraph 80(1) currently reads as follows:130 
“80. Capital gain attributed to beneficiary. – (1) Subject to paragraphs 68, 69, 
71 and 72, where a capital gain is determined in respect of the vesting by a 
trust of an asset in a trust beneficiary (other than any person contemplated in 
paragraph 62(a) to (e)) or a person who acquires that asset as an equity 
instrument as contemplated in section 8C(1)) who is a resident, that gain – 
(a) must be disregarded for the purpose of calculating the aggregate capital 
gain or aggregate capital loss of the trust; and 
(b) must be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the aggregate 
capital gain or aggregate capital loss of the beneficiary to whom that asset was 
so disposed of.” 
It is notable that this paragraph explicitly excludes instances where the asset which is 
disposed of to a trust beneficiary constitutes an equity instrument for purposes of section 
8C of the ITA.131  
Based on the wording of paragraph 80(1) and the explicit exclusion of section 8C 
instruments from the attribution provision, it would mean that, where a SIT disposes of a 
qualifying equity instrument to a participant, the capital gain which arises from the 
disposal will remain taxable in the hands of the SIT at an 80% inclusion rate as it cannot 
be attributed to the participant. The SIT will therefore have to account for the capital gain 
                                                
130 For emphasis, the problematic wording in this paragraph has been indicated in bold type. 
131 SARS, “Comprehensive Guide to Capital Gains Tax 2018”, accessed on 25 October 2018, 
http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/OpsDocs/Guides/LAPD-CGT-G01%20-
%20Comprehensive%20Guide%20to%20Capital%20Gains%20Tax.pdf,582-583. 
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under paragraph 11 upon the vesting of the equity instrument.132 Furthermore, upon 
vesting of these equity instruments in the participant, these equity instruments will be 
taxed as income in the participant’s hands.133  
The wording of paragraph 80(1) therefore results in there being double taxation where an 
employee SIT vests the actual underlying equity instruments in participants.  
4.2.2 Paragraph 80(2) 
In addition and in contrast to the position where an employee SIT vests the actual equity 
shares in the participants, one must pay particular notice to the wording of paragraph 
80(2). This paragraph has been amended numerous times, the latest of which was during 
2017. This amendment, together with the introduction of paragraph 64E (see discussion 
below), was intended to rid the Eighth Schedule of the unintended anomaly of double 
taxation which was unintentionally caused due to an overlap in the 2015/2016 
amendments. 
The current wording of this subparagraph, as amended by section 75(1)(a) of the Taxation 
Laws Amendment Act 17 of 2017, is set below:134  
“(2) Subject to paragraphs 64E, 68, 69[,] and 71 [and 72], where a capital gain 
is determined in respect of the disposal of an asset by a trust in a year of 
assessment during which a trust beneficiary (other than any person 
contemplated in paragraph 62(a) to (e)) who is a resident has a vested 
[interest] right or acquires a vested [interest] right (including [an interest 
caused] a right created by the exercise of a discretion) [in] to an amount 
derived from that capital gain but not [in] to the asset, the disposal of which 
gave rise to the capital gain, [the whole or the portion] so much of the capital 
gain [so vested] as is equal to the amount to which that trust beneficiary is 
entitled in terms of that right –  
                                                
132 SARS, 582-583. 
133 Ibid. 
134 For purposes of clarity, the current wording of the section is presented as contained in section 75(1)(a) 
of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act. As such, words in bold in square brackets indicate omissions from 
existing enactments, whereas words which are underlined indicate insertions into existing enactments.  
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(a) must be disregarded for the purpose of calculating the aggregate capital gain 
or aggregate capital loss of the trust; and 
(b) must be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the aggregate capital 
gain or capital loss of the beneficiary [in whom the gain vests] who is entitled 
to that amount.” 
Paragraph 80(2) provides that, where a trust asset is disposed of by the trust and the 
beneficiary acquires a vested right to the amount arising from the capital gain on the 
disposal, the trust must disregard the amount for CGT purposes and the amount must be 
taken into account in determining the participant’s aggregate capital gain.135 
What is critical to bear in mind, however, is that the interaction of this anti-avoidance 
provision with those contained in section 8C of the ITA. Section 8C includes all equity 
instruments which fall within the ambit of section 8C in the remuneration of the participant 
which is in then taxed as part of his taxable income at his marginal rate. This would include 
the gains received by the participant upon the disposal of the shares. Without the 
amendment to paragraph 80(2) which caused this paragraph to be subject to the newly 
introduced paragraph 64E,136 a participant would have been liable to pay both income tax 
on the amount received on the value of the equity instruments, as well as CGT as the 
capital gain is attributed to the participant in terms of paragraph 80(2).  
4.2.3 Introduction of paragraph 64E to the Eighth Schedule 
Section 64E was introduced into the ITA by section 74(1) of the Taxation Laws 
Amendment Act 17 of 2017 and reads as follows:  
“64E. Disposal by trust in terms of share incentive scheme. – Where a capital 
gain is determined in respect of the disposal of an asset by a trust and a trust 
beneficiary has a vested right to an amount derived from that capital gain, that 
trust must disregard so much of that capital gain as is equal to that amount if 
that amount must in terms of section 8C be – 
                                                
135 SARS, 587. 
136 This point is discussed and emphasised in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Taxation Laws 
Amendment Bill 2017. These two paragraphs were introduced into the ITA simultaneously, with 
application in respect of amounts received or accrued from 1 March 2017 onwards. 
 47 
 
(a) included in the income of that trust beneficiary as an amount received or 
accrued in respect of a restricted equity instrument; or 
(b) taken into account in determining the gain or loss in the hands of that trust 
beneficiary in respect of the vesting of a restricted equity instrument.”  
This section effectively provides that, where a SIT disposes of equity instruments in terms 
of an employee share incentive scheme, the SIT will disregard so much of the capital gain 
equal to the amount to which the participants have a vested by virtue of 64E(a), thereby 
ensuring that no capital gain is attributed the participant in terms of section 80(2).137 
Therefore, in the instances where an employee share incentive scheme operating through 
a SIT disposes of the shares held in SIT and vests the gains received in the participants, 
the amounts received by the participants will not be taxable as a capital gain in the hands 
of the participants, but will only be subject to income tax in the participant’s hands at his 
or her marginal rate in terms of section 8C.138 
The implications of these provisions are illustrated in the case study below. 
4.2.4 Case study 
4.2.4.1 Common facts 
Mr X, a South African resident is an employee of ABC Limited, a South African resident 
company. ABC Limited’s remuneration philosophy is aimed at attracting and retaining 
talented employees whilst at the same time driving the growth of the company’s share 
price. All employees are awarded annual grants of share appreciation rights (“SARs”). 
ABC Limited’s SAR Plan operates through a SIT which was established for purposes of 
administering the Plan.  
The SIT grants Mr X 100 SARs in ABC Limited on 1 September 2013, with the value of 
an ABC Limited Share being R50. The vesting of the SARs is subject to Mr X remaining 
in the employ of ABC Limited for a period of three years from the award date. Upon the 
                                                
137 SARS, 504. 
138 Ibid. 
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vesting of the SARs, Mr X has a further two year period during which to exercise his 
SARs. 
Mr X’s SARs vest on 1 September 2016. Mr X decides to exercise his SARs on 1 July 
2017 at which time the share price of ABC Limited is R100.  
4.2.4.2 Option 1 – Equity-settlement 
The ABC SAR Plan is an equity-settled plan and Mr X is therefore entitled to receive ABC 
Limited shares to the value of the difference between the share price on the award date 
and on the exercise date. The SIT settles 500 shares139 to Mr X. 
Income Tax consequences under the current anti-avoidance provisions: 
Mr X receives the SAR by virtue of his employment with ABC Limited. The SAR qualifies 
as a restricted equity instrument in terms of section 8C(7) until such time as it is exercised 
as it constitutes a contractual right of which the value is determined directly with reference 
to a share in ABC Limited, and the vesting of the SAR is subject to the satisfaction of 
certain vesting conditions.  
On exercise of the SARs, Mr X will become unconditionally entitled to the settlement of 
his award in shares by the SIT and his award will be deemed to vest for purposes of 
section 8C(3)(b)(i). A capital gain will be determined in respect of the vesting of the shares 
in Mr X by the SIT and the gain must, in terms of the ITA be treated as follows: 
1. The gain arising on the vesting of the shares in Mr X must be taxed in the SIT as 
the gain is not attributed to Mr X in terms of paragraph 80(1) of the Eighth Schedule 
and paragraph 80(1) is not subject to paragraph 64E; AND 
2. The gain must be included in Mr X’s gross income in terms of section 8C(1)(a)(i) 
as a gain received in respect of a restricted equity instrument acquired by Mr X by 
virtue of his employment. 
In essence, double taxation will occur as is illustrated above. 
                                                
139 The difference between the share price on award and on exercise is R50. As such, Mr. X is entitled to 
shares to the value of R5000 (100 SARs x R50). This results in 100 shares (R5000 / R100 per share) 
being settled to Mr. X. 
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4.2.4.3 Option 2 – Cash-settlement 
The ABC SAR Plan provides for cash settlement of awards. On exercise of the SARs the 
SIT disposes of the shares to a third party and vests the proceeds of R5000140 in Mr X 
(as a participant with a vested right to the amount derived from the capital gain on the 
disposal of the shares) in lieu of the shares.  
Income Tax consequences under the current anti-avoidance provisions: 
As is the case in Option 1 above, Mr X receives restricted equity instruments in the form 
of SARs by virtue of his employment with ABC Limited. On exercise of the SARs, Mr X 
will become unconditionally entitled to the settlement of his award in cash and his award 
will be deemed to vest for purposes of section 8C(3)(b)(i). A capital gain will be 
determined in respect of the disposal of the shares and so much of the gain as is equal 
to the amount derived from the capital gain and to which Mr X is entitled will vest in him.  
In terms of the ITA, the gain will be treated as follows: 
1. The gain of R5000 must be included in Mr X’s gross income in terms of section 
8C(1A) as a gain received in respect of a restricted equity instrument acquired by 
Mr X by virtue of his employment; and  
2. In terms of paragraphs 80(2) and 64E, the SIT must disregarded the R5000 gain 
as an equivalent amount is included in Mr X’s income in terms of section 8C. 
Option 2 would therefore be the most tax efficient. 
4.2.5 Conclusion: Effectiveness of the anti-avoidance provisions 
Although the provisions appear to be successful in preventing the avoidance of tax by 
ensuring that amounts are correctly included as income in the hands of employee 
beneficiaries, paragraphs 80(1) and 64E remain problematic. 
As is clear from the above case study, equity-settled schemes are consequently rendered 
less tax efficient when compared to cash-settled schemes as the gain arising from the 
disposal of the shares from the SIT to the employee will result in double taxation as the 
                                                
140 The difference between the share price on award and on exercise is R50. As such, Mr. X is entitled to 
the value of R5000 (100 SARs x R50). 
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gain will be taxed as a capital gain in the hands of the SIT and as income in the hands of 
the participant. In contrast, where the underlying shares are disposed of by the SIT and 
the profits are vested in the participants, the gain will only be taxed as income in the hands 
of the employees. Effectively, this means that the following two unintended anomalies 
result from the current wording of the anti-avoidance provisions in the ITA: 
1. Double taxation where the SIT vests the actual underlying equity instruments in 
the participant; and 
2. Unequal tax treatment of employee share incentive schemes operating through 
SITs on the basis of how the award is settled. 
Therefore, although National Treasury appears to have succeeded in addressing the 
anomaly of double taxation resulting from the 2015/2016 amendments to the ITA, a the 
above similar anomaly of double taxation persists and an additional anomaly has 
inadvertently been created.  
4.3 Response documents to Treasury 
It is worth noting that the above anomalies were highlighted in presentations to National 
Treasury during the 2017 legislative cycle in response to the proposed amendments in 
the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill 2017.  
The Final Response Document on Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2017 and Tax 
Administration Bill, 2017, sets out the purpose of the proposed amendments to the ITA, 
being a clarification of the interaction of the provisions of section 8C(1A) and the 
provisions of the Eighth Schedule by inserting a new paragraph 64E in the Eighth 
Schedule which makes provision for amounts that are included in the employees’ taxable 
income in terms of the anti-avoidance provisions of section 8C(1A) to be disregarded for 
CGT purposes.141  
The following comment as extracted from submissions to National Treasury on the above 
proposal is set out in the Final Response Document: 142 
                                                
141 National Treasury, Final Response Document, paragraph 2.3 on 12.  
142 Ibid. 
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“Paragraph 80(1) of the Eighth Schedule should also be amended to remove 
the exclusion of section 8C equity instruments and be made subject to 
paragraph 64E of the Eighth Schedule, which should be amended to also cater 
for distributions of equity instruments by an employee share trust.” 
National Treasury acknowledged the above comment and suggested amendments in 
respect of the proposed amendments contemplated in the Taxation Laws Amendment 
Bill by reply of “Noted”,143 but took no action to implement these suggested amendments 
as is evident from the resulting current wording of the anti-avoidance provisions. To date, 
no explanation for the lack of actions appears to have been provided. 
4.4 Addressing the remaining anomalies: suggested changes to current wording of 
anti-avoidance provisions 
In order to address the above two anomalies, the following amendments to the ITA are 
suggested:144 
4.4.1 Paragraph 80(1) 
Paragraph 80(1) should be amended and be made subject to section 64E. The 
amendments should further include removing the exclusion of section 8C equity 
instruments from this paragraph. The amendment paragraph could read as follows: 
80. (1) Subject to paragraphs 64E, 68, 69, 71 and 72, where a capital gain is 
determined in respect of the vesting by a trust of an asset in a trust beneficiary 
(other than any person contemplated in paragraph 62(a) to (e)) [or a person 
who acquires that asset as an equity instrument as contemplated in 
section 8C(1)] ) who is a resident, that gain – 
(a) must be disregarded for the purpose of calculating the aggregate capital 
gain or aggregate capital loss of the trust; and 
                                                
143 Ibid.  
144 For ease of reference, the proposed amendments set out in this section follow the style of the Taxation 
Laws Amendment Acts in respect of highlighting omissions from and insertions to the existing provisions. 
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(b) must be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the aggregate 
capital gain or aggregate capital loss of the beneficiary to whom that asset was 
so disposed of. 
The above wording will ensure that, where an employee SIT vests the actual underlying 
shares in the employee beneficiaries, the gain which arises from the disposal of the 
shares by the SIT will be disregarded in the hands of the SIT, but rather be taken taxed 
as income in the hands of the participant. These proposed amendments, together with 
the suggested amendments to paragraph 64E below will ensure that employee SITs 
which dispose of the actual underlying equity instruments to the employee beneficiaries 
in the vesting of the instruments are treated the same for tax purposes as schemes where 
the shares are sold and the profits are vested in the employee beneficiaries. 
4.4.2 Paragraph 64E 
Paragraph 64E, in its current form, provides that a trust must disregard so much of the 
capital gain as is equal to the amount derived from the capital gain which is determined 
in respect of the disposals of an asset by the trust to a third party and which amount must 
be included in the participant’s income for purposes of section 8C. This paragraph does 
not at present allow for a capital gain to be disregarded where it is determined in respect 
of the disposal of the trust assets by the vesting thereof in the trust beneficiaries. 
Following the suggested amendment to paragraph 80(1) above, paragraph 64E should 
be amended so as to also provide for the distribution of equity instruments by the SIT. 
The following wording is proposed for paragraph 64E: 
64E. Disposal by trust in terms of share incentive scheme. – 
(1) Where a capital gain is determined in respect of the vesting by a trust of an 
asset in a trust beneficiary, or where a capital gain is determined in respect of 
the disposal of an asset by a trust and a trust beneficiary has a vested right to 
an amount derived from that capital gain, that trust must disregard so much of 
that capital gain as is determined in respect of that disposal and must in terms 
of section 8C be – 
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(c) Included in the income of that trust beneficiary as an amount received or 
accrued in respect of a restricted equity instrument; or 
(d) Taken into account in determining the gain or loss in the hands of that trust 
beneficiary in respect of the vesting of a restricted equity instrument. 
4.5 Latest proposed amendments under the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2018 
The Taxation Laws Amendment Bill for 2018 was released for public comment during July 
of 2018. As was the case with the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill 2017, it appears that 
National Treasury has not taken the steps necessary to address the remaining anomaly 
as the suggested changes contained in the Final Response Document are not proposed 
for paragraphs 64E and 80(1).  
It is instead proposed in section 86(1) that paragraphs 80(1) and 80(2) be substituted by 
the following paragraphs:: 
“80(1) “Subject to paragraphs 68, 69 and 71 [and 72], where a trust vests an 
asset in a beneficiary of that trust (other than any person contemplated in 
paragraph 62(a) to (e) or a person who acquires that asset as an equity 
instrument as contemplated in section 8C(1)) who is a resident and determines 
a capital gain in respect of that disposal or, if that trust is not a resident, would 
have determined a capital gain, in respect of [the vesting by a trust of an 
asset in a trust beneficiary, that gain] that disposal had it been a resident—  
(a) that capital gain must be disregarded for the purpose of calculating the 
aggregate capital gain or aggregate capital loss of the trust; and  
(b) that capital gain or the amount that would have been determined as a 
capital gain must be taken into account as a capital gain for the purpose of 
calculating the aggregate capital gain or aggregate capital loss of the 
beneficiary to whom that asset was so disposed of.” 
“80(2) Subject to paragraphs 64E, 68, 69 and 71, where a trust determines a 
capital gain (or, if that trust is not a resident, would have determined a capital 
gain had it been a resident) in respect of the disposal of an asset [by a trust] 
in a year of assessment during which a [trust] beneficiary of that trust (other 
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than any person contemplated in paragraph 62(a) to (e)) who is a resident has 
a vested right or acquires a vested right (including a right created by the 
exercise of a discretion) to an amount derived, directly or indirectly, from that 
capital gain or from the amount that would have been determined as a capital 
gain had that trust been a resident but not to the asset disposed of, [the 
disposal of which gave rise to the capital gain,] an amount that is equal to 
so much of [the capital gain as is equal to] the amount to which that [trust] 
beneficiary of that trust is entitled in terms of that right as consists of or is 
derived, directly or indirectly, from—  
(a) that capital gain must be disregarded for the purpose of calculating the 
aggregate capital gain or aggregate capital loss of the trust; and  
(b) that capital gain or the amount that would have been determined as a 
capital gain must be taken into account as a capital gain for the purpose of 
calculating the aggregate capital gain or aggregate capital loss of [the] that 
beneficiary [who is entitled to that amount].” 
The Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill 2018 
provides a brief explanation of the proposed changes to the above paragraphs. It states 
that the government has been concerned that the Controlled Foreign Company (hereafter 
“CFCs”) rules do not sufficiently capture foreign companies which are held by interposed 
foreign trusts. Amendments were made to these CFC rules during the 2017 legislative 
cycle to extend the application thereof to foreign companies held through foreign trusts 
whose finanical results form part of the consolidated financial statements of a group of 
which the parent company is a South African resident company.145 These amendents did 
not address the situation where a South African resident has an indirect interest in a 
foreign company through a foreign trust.146  
                                                
145 National Treasury, “Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2018”, 39-40, 
accessed 1 October 2018, 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/TLAB%20and%20TALAB%202018%20Draft/2018%20D
raft%20Explanatory%20Memorandum%20on%20the%202018%20draft%20TLAB.pdf  
146 Ibid.  
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Instead of addressing the perceived anomalies, the proposed changes are aimed at 
closing the perceived loophole in the current tax legislation regarding the use of trusts to 
defer tax or recharacterise the nature of income.147 As part of addressing this loophole, 
the following is proposed: 
“D. Disregarding participation exemption in respect of capital gains derived 
from the sale of foreign shsares for purposes of attribution of capital gain in 
terms of paragraph 80 of the Eighth Shcedule to the Act 
In determining an amount of capital gain that should be attributed in terms of 
paragraph 80 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act, in the hands of a resident 
beneficiary, it is proposed that the participation exemtpion as contemplated in 
paragraph 64B of the Eighth Schedule to the Act in respect of capital gains 
derived from the sale of shares held by the foreign trust (in which a beneficiary 
is a resident) in a foreign company should be disregarded.”148  
As noted in Chapter 1, the scope of this disseration is limited to South African trusts and 
beneficiaries, but it is worth noting that the above proposed amendments appear to have 
the following effects: 
1. In respect of paragraph 80(1), the amendment would result in South African 
resident beneficiaries being liable for capital gains which arise due to the vesting 
an asset in the resident beneficiary, irrespective of whether the asset is vested in 
the beneficiary by a foreign trust or a South African resident trust.  
2. Paragraph 80(2) would result in South African resident beneficiaries being liable 
for capital gains which is detemrined in respect of a disposal of an asset by either 
a foreign trust or a South African resident trust and in which the beneficiary has a 
vested right to the amount derived from the capital gain. 
As such, it appears that for purposes of paragraph 80, the tax consequences in respect 
of foreign trusts and South African trusts would be similar. A deeper analysis of the 
proposed amendmends and the CFC rules is however required to determine the full 
                                                
147 Ibid.  
148 Ibid, 40. 
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effects of these amendments and whether the amendments would succeed in closing the 
identified loophole. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the current wording of the anti-avoidance provisions impacting on 
SITs as contained in Eighth Schedule and concluded that, while these provisions appear 
to be successful in preventing the avoidance of tax by ensuring that amounts are correctly 
characterised as income in the hands of employee beneficiaries, paragraphs 80(1) and 
64E remain problematic. The following two anomalies persist in relation to the CGT 
implications of employee share incentive schemes operating through SITs: 
1. Where an employee SIT disposes of an actual share to a participant, the shares will 
be subject to capital gains tax in the SIT, as well as to income tax in terms of section 
8C in the hands of the participant thereby resulting in double taxation.  
2. In contrast, however, the participant will only be liable for income tax in the case where 
the participant receives an amount equal in value to the shares which have been 
disposed of by the SIT prior to the vesting of the amount in the participant. This results 
in the unequal tax treatment of employee share incentive schemes operating through 
SITs in respect of the settlement mechanisms used.  
In addition to the above tax consequences impacting on participants to employee share 
incentive schemes operating through a SIT, it is important to note the widespread effect 
of these provisions. These anomalies are of particular concern for BBBEE schemes. 
These schemes are typically set up so that qualifying participants receive actual equity 
shares at a future date, thereby giving these participants the opportunity to become 
shareholders in the company. This is further required for a company to obtain the relevant 
points required for the company’s BBBEE scorecard. In light of the above anomalies, 
these schemes would be less tax efficient than a scheme in which the underlying shares 
are sold by the SIT and the gains are vested in the participants, as the BBBEE SIT will 
be required to pay CGT on the shares vested in the participants. This could be a potential 
deterrent for the implementation of such schemes, as well as for the continuation of 
existing schemes in their current form.  
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It is submitted that the above anomalies could easily be addressed, as is clear from the 
Final Response Document setting out submissions to National Treasury which indicates 
the suggested changes to the above paragraphs. In spite of this, no steps seem to have 
been taken by National Treasury to rectify and address this anomaly as is also evident 
from the proposed amendments in the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill 2018. 
Recommendations on possible amendments to these provisions for mitigating the 
anomalies are provided.  
In conclusion, it is notable that the current wording of the above anti-avoidance provisions 
do not have retrospective application. As such, these provisions are only applicable as of 
1 March 2017 onwards. This could potentially lead to uncertainty with regards to the tax 
treatment of employee share incentive awards where the underlying shares are vested in 
the participants to the scheme. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Over the past decade, anti-avoidance measures were introduced into the ITA to 
specifically regulate the tax consequences of employee share incentive schemes 
operating through South African resident share incentive trusts (“SITs”). The anti-
avoidance provisions impacting on employee share incentive schemes operating through 
SITs as contained in section 8C, section 10(1)(k)(i) and the Eighth Schedule to the ITA 
have been a particular focus of National Treasury. Amendments were made to the ITA to 
refine these anti-avoidance provisions and to address several unintended anomalies, 
including the anomaly that the disposal of an equity instrument by a trust to a qualifying 
participant constitutes a non-event for capital gains tax (“CGT”) purposes in terms of the 
Eighth Schedule.149  
In light hereof, this dissertation aimed to achieve the following research objectives: 
1. To consider the most prevalent employee share incentive schemes in South Africa, 
with a focus on schemes which utilise SITs, in order to provide the necessary 
context for the discussions in chapters 3 and 4 with regards to the anti-avoidance 
provisions in section 8C, section 10(1)(k)(i) and the Eighth Schedule which impact 
on employee share incentive schemes operating through SITs. 
2. To explore the development of these anti-avoidance provisions impacting on 
employee share incentive schemes operating through SITs over the last decade, 
with a focus on identifying anomalies created by and/or addressed by amendments 
to these provisions. 
3. To conduct an analysis of the perceived anomalies that still persist in relation to 
the CGT implications of employee share incentive schemes operating through 
SITs, including recommendations of possible amendments which could be made 
                                                
149 National Treasury, 2015, 10 and the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 25 of 2015 at section 123; and 
the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 17 of 2017 which amendment paragraphs 80(1), 80(2), 80(2A) and 
64E of the Eighth Schedule. See also section 13(1) of Taxation Laws Amendment Act 15 of 2016 which 
amended section 8C(1A). 
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to the anti-avoidance provisions in the Eighth Schedule to address these 
anomalies. 
In order to meet the above research objectives, this dissertation discussed (a) the 
common structures of employee share incentive schemes operating through SITs in 
Chapter 2; (b) the anti-avoidance provisions impacting on employee share incentive 
schemes operating through SITs in Chapter 3; and (c) the current anti-avoidance 
provisions of the Eighth Schedule in Chapter 4. A summary of the findings of this study is 
set out below. 
5.2  Summary of findings 
Employee share incentive schemes are common in South African companies.150 Share 
incentive schemes aimed at the remuneration of executives and employees were 
originally introduced as a mechanism through which companies attempted to counter the 
high levels of individual taxes.151 Over the years, different types of schemes have 
developed so as to address the various needs of companies and to mitigate the changes 
in income tax legislation152 impacting upon the operation of these schemes.153  
Chapter 2 explored the rationale behind companies adopting share incentive schemes 
and the key variable features of employee share incentive schemes. It also identified and 
set out the salient features of the most prevalent employee share incentive schemes in 
South Africa which typically make use of a SIT. It was concluded that the most prevalent 
employee share incentive schemes which are run through SITs are share purchase 
schemes, share option schemes, deferred delivery schemes and phantom share 
schemes and BBBEE schemes. This chapter provided the necessary context for the 
discussions in chapters 3 and 4 with regards to the anti-avoidance provisions in section 
8C, section 10(1)(k)(i) and the Eighth Schedule which impact on employee share 
incentive schemes operating through SITs. 
                                                
150 Isaacman, 11. 
151 M Stafford, 2005.  
152 Refer to the discussion in chapter 3 on the various changes to the ITA impacting upon such schemes. 
153 Isaacman, 11; Jonas, 16. 
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Chapter 3 aimed to explore the development of these anti-avoidance provisions impacting 
employee share incentive schemes operating through SITs over the last decade, with a 
focus on identifying anomalies created by and/or addressed by the amendments to these 
provisions. It provided the reader with the history and original purpose behind the 
implementation of the key anti-avoidance provisions contained in sections 8C, 10(1)(k)(i) 
and the Eighth Schedule of the ITA which impacts on the tax consequences of employee 
share incentive schemes operating through SITs. It was determined that the aim of these 
provisions was to prevent income derived from the vesting of restricted equity instruments 
being classified as dividends or capital gains which are taxed at a lower rates 
It was furthermore concluded that the anti-avoidance provisions contained in section 8C 
and section 10(1)(k)(i) have had a widespread impact on the tax consequences of 
employee share incentive schemes, particularly those schemes operated through a SITs. 
The aforementioned provisions appear to effectively fulfil their intended function, i.e. to 
prevent income derived from the vesting of restricted equity instruments as being 
classified as dividend.  
In respect of the anti-avoidance provisions contained in the Eighth Schedule, it was 
concluded that the amendments to the ITA during the 2015, 2016 and 2017 legislative 
cycles resulted in the creation of unintended anomalies with regards to employee share 
incentive schemes operating through SITs. These anomalies included double taxation 
which arose due to the 2015 and 2016 amendments in respect of the interaction between 
section 8C(1A) and the Eighth Schedule. It was concluded that anomalies persist in 
relation to the CGT treatment of SITs as a result of the current wording of the anti-
avoidance provisions contained in the Eighth Schedule. In light hereof, a detailed 
discussion in respect of the anti-avoidance provisions contained in the Eighth Schedule 
and impacting on SITs was discussed separately in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 4 aimed to conduct an analysis of the perceived anomalies that still persist in 
relation to the CGT implications of employee share incentive schemes operating through 
SITs. It further aimed to provide recommendations of possible amendments which could 
be made to the anti-avoidance provisions in the Eighth Schedule to address these 
anomalies. 
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The current wording of the anti-avoidance provisions impacting on SITs as contained in 
Eighth Schedule was analysed and it was concluded that, while these provisions appear 
to be successful in preventing the avoidance of tax by ensuring that amounts are correctly 
characterised as income in the hands of employee beneficiaries, paragraphs 80(1) and 
64E remain problematic. It was further concluded that the following two anomalies persist 
in relation to the CGT implications of employee share incentive schemes operating 
through SITs: 
1. Where an employee SIT disposes of an actual share to a participant, the shares will 
be subject to capital gains tax in the SIT, as well as to income tax in terms of section 
8C in the hands of the participant thereby resulting in double taxation.  
2. In contrast, however, the participant will only be liable for income tax in the case where 
the participant receives an amount equal in value to the shares which have been 
disposed of by the SIT prior to the vesting of the amount in the participant. This results 
in the unequal tax treatment of employee share incentive schemes operating through 
SITs in respect of the settlement mechanisms used.  
Chapter 4 further highlighted the fact that the anomalies are of particular concern for 
BBBEE schemes. These schemes are typically set up so that qualifying participants 
receive actual equity shares at a future date, thereby giving these participants the 
opportunity to become shareholders in the company. This is further required for a 
company to obtain the relevant points required for the company’s BBBEE scorecard. In 
light of the above anomalies, these schemes would be less tax efficient than a scheme in 
which the underlying shares are sold by the SIT and the gains are vested in the 
participants, as the BBBEE SIT will be required to pay CGT on the shares vested in the 
participants. This could be a potential deterrent for the implementation of such schemes, 
as well as for the continuation of existing schemes in their current form.  
It was submitted that the perceived anomalies which persist in relation of the CGT 
treatment of SITs could easily be addressed, as is clear from the Final Response 
Document setting out submissions to National Treasury which indicates the suggested 
changes to the above paragraphs. In spite of this, no steps seem to have been taken by 
National Treasury to rectify and address this anomaly as is also evident from the proposed 
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amendments in the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill 2018. Recommendations on possible 
amendments to these provisions for mitigating the anomalies were provided.  
In conclusion, Chapter 4 noted that the current wording of the above anti-avoidance 
provisions do not have retrospective application. As such, these provisions are only 
applicable as of 1 March 2017 onwards. This could potentially lead to uncertainty with 
regards to the tax treatment of employee share incentive awards where the underlying 
shares are vested in the participants to the scheme. 
 In light of the findings of this study set out above, it is submitted that this dissertation met 
the research objectives set out in Chapter 1. 
5.3 Recommendations 
The anti-avoidance provisions in the Eighth Schedule remain problematic in that the 
wording of and interaction between these anti-avoidance provisions result in unintended 
double taxation occurring where an equity-settled employee share incentive scheme is 
operated through a SIT. This outcome is problematic as it would mean that such schemes 
are less tax efficient than schemes were the underlying shares are sold and the profits 
vested in the employee participants, thereby resulting in unequal tax treatment based on 
the methods of settlement. The amendments have to date not succeeded in addressing 
the anomalies and closing the loopholes as was originally intended. 
It is therefore recommended that paragraphs 80(1) and 64E of the Eighth Schedule be 
amended as per the suggestion set out in Chapter 4 above in order to ensure that 
employee beneficiaries to employee share incentive schemes operating through SITs are 
treated equally irrespective of whether the scheme is equity-settled or cash settled. 
5.4 Future areas of study 
The scope of this dissertation was limited to exploring the impact of select anti-avoidance 
provisions on employee share incentive schemes operating through SITs. The lack of 
retrospective application of the anti-avoidance provisions was not explored in any 
significant detail, and the impact thereof on employee share incentive schemes could 
potentially be an area for further study. 
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The anti-avoidance provisions relating to dividends were limited to those paid to 
participants to employee share incentive schemes operating through SITs. The full impact 
of these provisions on all employee share incentive schemes should be explored in order 
to determine whether the provisions, as they currently stand, are sufficiently preventing 
the mischiefs as intended. 
 
 
(18, 298 words, excluding footnotes) 
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